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1 General introduction 
 
1.1 Social learning 
Social learning is defined by Galef (1976, 1988) as an increase in the probabilities of acquiring 
behaviours as a result of an interaction with a subject who already acquired it individually. For 
behavioural similarity among individuals to rely on a social learning process, the learner must be able 
to perform the action also after the end of the interaction between the subjects. Thus all the instances in 
which the behaviour of an individual triggers a similar response in the other only as long as they 
interact are excluded. Galef (1888) proposed the general term ‘social enhancement’ to refer to those 
situations in which the social interaction influences the observer who will perform actions that are 
already part of his behaviour repertoire. In his view the term ‘social learning’ would only refer to those 
situations in which the observer acquires (or extinguish) a behaviour. In case the acquired behaviour 
becomes part of the repertoire of the observer also after the end of the interaction with the model, Galef 
(1976) refers to ‘social transmission of behaviour’. Similarly Whiten and Ham (1992) distinguish 
between two categories of social processes that can determine behavioural similarity among 
individuals: social influence and social learning. The difference between the two is that through social 
learning the observer acquires some new information or behaviour, while through social influence he is 
influenced by the model but performs a behaviour that is already part of his behaviour repertoire, thus 
he does not learn something specifically. 
Social learning has received little attention from the comparative psychologists in the past, the main 
focus of their research being individual learning. The interest of biologists for the adaptive value of 
behaviour for the survival and reproductive success of animals has led them to suggest that social 
learning fills an important niche between species-typical, genetically predisposed behaviour and 
individual (trial and error) learning (Boyd and Richerson 1988). While species typical behaviour is 
 5 
reliable and does not vary if the environment is modified, it may sometimes be not functional. For 
example, a hungry animal may be forced to try new kinds of food, if its familiar one is no longer 
present, but not all new food is edible and sometimes it may be poisonous. Such changes in the 
environment may force animals to learn by experiencing the consequences of their actions (Zentall 
2006), which, as in the example of poisonous food, can be dangerous. Thus some species evolved ways 
to reduce the negative consequences of trial and error procedures through social learning. Learning by 
observing others provides more flexibility than species typical behaviours and it also prevents incurring 
in many negative consequences that often accompany individual learning, because in most cases the 
behaviour of the model has been already shaped by the outcomes. 
Thus it is possible that a selective pressure for evolving some forms of social learning exists for species 
living in groups. Ethological observations indeed indicate that social interactions allow spreading 
information about the environment and behavioural habits that are kept constant through time, being 
transmitted from one generation to the next (e.g., van De Waal et al. 2012; Hinde and Fisher 1951; 
Kawai 1965; Bonner 1980). 
 
1.1.1 Mechanisms  
Biologists and psychologists had two different approaches to the study of social learning: while 
biologists tended to focus on its adaptive value, psychologists were more interested in the mechanisms 
by which individuals learn from others. In different periods and for different reasons ethologists and 
psychologists have distinguished a variety of social learning processes and have introduced a large 
number of different definitions: instinctive imitation (Morgan 1900), stimulus enhancement (Spence 
1937a), match dependent behaviour (Miller and Dollard 1941) and local enhancement (Thorpe 1963). 
Unfortunately, often these terminological differences do not define different observable behaviours. 
Although, it is now widely recognized that several different processes can be responsible for 
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behavioural similarity as a consequence of social learning (e.g., Visalberghi and Fargaszy 1990, 
Tomasello 1990, Zentall 2006; Froese and Leavens 2014), it is not trivial to distinguish among these 
mechanisms, especially as there is no distinction between terms used with a merely descriptive function 
and explanatory terms (Galef 1988) and rarely investigators of social learning refer to animal learning 
theory, even when they are discussing mechanisms (Heyes 1994). Furthermore behavioural similarity 
can also be due to other non-social mechanisms (Galef 1976; Whiten and Ham 1992), such as mimesis, 
or processes of individual learning.  
Unfortunately, the debates on the classification of the various learning processes within the range of 
social learning did not end with a consensus among scientists on what is imitation and what are the 
other non-imitative learning processes (e.g., Galef 1988, Heyes 1994, Mitchell 1989, Whiten and Ham 
1992, Zentall 2006).  
Here the most important processes of social influence and social learning are described: 
 
1.2.2 Mechanisms of social influence 
Contagion: 
This term refers to those situations in which the behaviour of the model triggers a similar behavioural 
response in the observer, who performs an action that is already part of his species-typical repertoire 
(Zentall 2006). Thus the behaviour of the model acts as a releaser for the unlearned behaviour of the 
observer (Thorpe 1963). Tinbergen (1960) referred to this process for the coordinated movements 
between males and females during courtship displays. A typical case of contagion occurs when a 
satiated animal resumes eating upon the introduction of a hungry individual who starts eating (Tolman 
1964; Mc Farland 1985). Evidence of contagion comes also from simultaneous barking in dogs 
(Humphrey 1921) and yawning (e.g., Thorpe 1963; Provine 1986; Beanninger 1997; Campbell 2009), 
which has also been investigated between humans and dogs (Joli-Mascheroni et al 2008; Harr et al. 
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2009; Yoon and Tennie 2010; O’Hara and Reeve 2011; Silva and de Sousa 2011; Silva et al. 2012; 
Madsen Persson 2013). Unfortunately the interpretation of the results of these studies are controversial 
regarding the underlying mechanisms which were sometimes (incorrectly) given higher cognitive 
explanations, such as evidence for empathy – defined as a spectrum of resonant emotional responses - 
or even ‘low level imitation’. In our opinion the word ‘imitation’ should be used only when some 
learning occurs, as this is what is agreed by most scientists (see below). The controversy between 
cognitive (empathy, imitation) and ‘lower’ (contagion) explanations of the observed behavioural 
similarity adds even more confusion to the terminological issue about imitation and on the 
classification of social learning and social facilitation processes. Even if imitation could be claimed as 
the underlying mechanism, the alternative explanations should have been specifically addressed by 
experimental conditions instead of assuming one or the other hypothesis.  
The main characteristics of contagion are the following (Poli and Prato Previde 1994) : 
- The behaviour is already part of the species-typical repertoire of the observer who does not 
learn something socially; 
- The behaviour of the model and that of the observer are simultaneous and those processes in 
which the observer performs the behaviour after the interaction ends are excluded;  
- The behaviour of the observer can start or increase in frequency, but this occurs only in 
presence of other individuals performing the same activity, thus the passive presence of 
conspecifics is excluded. 
Probably contagious behaviours facilitate synchronization in groups (Evans 1970; Birke 1974 - who 
uses the term ‘facilitation’) and it is very likely that, after the environmental stimuli provided a more 
general synchronization, contagion supports a finer level of synchronization (Klopfer 1959). 
 
Social facilitation:  
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According to Zajonic (1965) the presence of a conspecific increases the probabilities of all the 
behavioural responses that would be elicited by the environment by affecting the motivational level. 
The presence of a conspecific (or of another individual) influences the motivational state of the subject, 
thus facilitating the performance of a response. The conspecific does not influence directly the 
acquisition of a specific information or behaviour, nevertheless its presence, by modifying the 
motivational state of the observer or reducing its fear (Galef 1988), produces changes in its behaviours 
and consequently increases the probabilities of acquiring a similar response (Davis 1973; Gardner and 
Engel 1971). In this case, as in contagion, the subject does not learn something socially from the 
partner, however his behaviour is influenced by its presence. For example a rat’s arousal may be 
increased by the presence of a conspecific and, as a consequence, also its general level of activity 
would increase, thus the rat performs a response (e.g., a bar pressing response) faster by getting in 
contact with the bar sooner, because of its increased level of activity (Gardner and Engel 1971). 
According to Davitz and Mason (1955) and Morrison and Hill (1967) an animal in isolation may be 
fearful, thus the presence of a conspecific, by reducing its fear, increases exploratory behaviour and 
leads to a higher probability of performing the target behaviour by chance.  
 Some authors do not distinguish between contagion and social facilitation because they do not find a 
difference in the response of observers whether the model is just present or also preforms the behaviour 
(Tolman and Wilson 1965; Galef 1971).  
 
1.1.3 Mechanisms of social learning  
Local enhancement: 
Seeing a subject acting in a particular location draws the attention of the observer to that place. This 
attentional response, in turn, may allow the subject to notice something that he would not have seen 
otherwise (Thorpe 1963). Thus through local enhancement the observer learns something about a 
 9 
location, not about a specific behaviour. The famous observations on great tits puncturing the top of 
milk bottles, for example, has been claimed to rely on local enhancement. Indeed this behaviour spread 
rapidly from one neighbourhood to the other (Fisher and Hinde 1949). It is not possible to exclude that 
the birds did not learn by imitation or goal emulation but a conservative explanation stresses that the 
attention of the observer birds has been probably drawn to the bottles thank to the presence of the 
feeding model bird and then, once reached the bottles, the observers found the source of food and 
consumed it. Having learned to identify a food source in the bottles, the birds tried to drink from a 
sealed bottle and learned individually how to puncture the top of it (Sherry and Galef 1984; 1990). 
Recently Hoppit et al. (2012) tested wild groups of meerkats on a social learning task that involves the 
observation of trained demonstrators that feed from a box using different options.  Right after the 
demonstration the observer meerkats were more likely to interact with the same box used by the 
demonstrator and this effect did not generalize to the same option type on the other box. Thus the 
authors concluded that the social learning effect right after the demonstration is highly spatially-
specific and suggest evidence for local enhancement rather than stimulus enhancement. 
It is thought that every time the behaviour of the model involves an object, to which the observer may 
later respond, local enhancement may be involved (Corson 1967; Jacoby and Dawson 1969; Oldfield-
Box 1970; Herbert and Harsh 1944). Thus studies on imitation of object-related actions should include 
proper controls (Lefebrve and Palmeta 1988). 
 
Stimulus enhancement:  
The activity of the demonstrator on a particular object may draw the attention of the observer towards 
that object (Spence 1937b) and, as a consequence it may increase the probabilities that the observer 
comes in contact with the object. The notion of stimulus enhancement seems to be broader than that of 
local enhancement because ‘stimulus’ was defined by Spence (1937) as a class of events that share 
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common attributes. In some studies a duplicate-chamber procedure has been used (Warden and Jackson 
1935; Gardner and Engel 1971). In this procedure two objects are present, one in the demonstrator’s 
chamber and one in the observer’s chamber. In this situation, if the observer increases its attention 
towards its own object, it is thought that this is due stimulus generalization because his object is similar 
to that in the model’s chamber (Henning and Zentall 1981; Levine and Zentall 1974; Zentall and 
Levine 1972). A similar procedure was also applied by Hoppitt et al. (2012) in the field, by using two 
feeding boxes in which the demonstrators were trained to feed using two different options (go through 
a cat flap or push a sleeve to enter the same box from a tube). This ‘Two-box design’ allowed the 
authors to disentangle stimulus enhancement from local enhancement by assuming that stimulus 
enhancement would be inferred if observation increased interaction with the same option-type (flap or 
tube) on a different box more than the different option-type on the different box. The results indicated 
that, immediately after demonstration, social learning was more pronounced for the same option and 
box used by the demonstrator and the authors suggest that this is a case of local enhancement. 
Stimulus enhancement may also be involved in the process of learning to respond to a certain 
discriminative stimulus, but not in the presence of another. In fact in this case the activity of the model 
that makes contact with the correct stimulus – but not with the negative one - draws the attention of the 
observer to it and consequently facilitates responding to it (Kohn and Dennis 1972; Kohn 1976; 
Edwards et al. 1980; Vanayan et al. 1985; Fiorito and Scotto 1992). 
 
Observational conditioning: 
The observer’s attention towards the object manipulated by the demonstrator is often followed by a 
specific consequence for the demonstrator (e.g., the presentation of food), thus the observation of a 
performing demonstrator may not only draw the observer’s attention to the object, but may also 
facilitate to establish an association (Whiten and Ham 1992). Pamaleta and Lefebvre (1985) found that 
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pigeons exposed to varying amounts of social information learned to solve a food-finding problem 
faster when exposed to a model pigeon eating after piercing the cover of the food container, as 
compared to conditions in which they were exposed to pigeons either only eating or only piercing. The 
authors thus suggest that the observers copied the model only if they saw that the action of the 
demonstrator had a certain consequence. This association can also be established with aversive 
consequences so that the object will be associated with the model’s fear response (Mineka and Cook 
1988). In observational conditioning the observer learns what to attend and the valence of the stimulus, 
but does not learn what action to perform. He performs a behaviour that is already part of his repertoire. 
However, in observational conditioning the observer also acquires information about the valence of the 
stimulus, for example that it is has an aversive valence (Whiten and Ham 1992). As the observer does 
not experience directly the consequence of the model’s action, observational conditioning is considered 
by some authors (Zentall and Hogan 1975) as a higher order conditioning because the onset of a 
stimulus followed by the presentation of the unconditioned stimulus, which is inaccessible for the 
subject, can produce the association even without a demonstrator subject. However, the presence of the 
demonstrator manipulating the object and receiving the reinforcer may further enhance the associative 
process (Zentall 2006). Further evidence of this process comes from the observation that, if the model 
is not reinforced or if its reinforcement cannot be observed, the acquisition of the response by the 
observer is impaired (Akins and Zentall 1998; Heyes et al. 1994; Pamaleta and Lefebvre 1985). 
Furthermore if the observer is reinforced at the same time as the demonstrator, the response is acquired 
faster (Del Russo 1971). An example of observational conditioning is given by Mineka and Cook 
(1988) who studied the acquisition of a fear response in laboratory reared monkeys by exposing them 
to wild conspecifics that showed an avoidance response in the presence of snakes. It is thought that the 
fearful conspecific acted as an unconditioned stimulus and the snake as the conditioned one. The 
exposure to the fearful conspecific alone or to the snake alone is not enough to acquire the fear 
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response by the observers. Observational conditioning may be the mechanism involved in social 
transmission of predator recognition and avoidance in mammals (Mineka and Cook 1988) and birds 
(Curio 1988). It has also been noticed that biologically relevant stimuli induce a more intense response 
than artificial ones (Curio et al 1978; Vieth et al. 1980). Blackbirds show a more intense fear response 
if they are exposed to a model bird reacting to a natural predator compared to when they are exposed to 
a model bird reacting to a plastic bottle. 
 
Goal emulation: 
Emulation occurs when, after observing a demonstrator interacting with objects, an observer becomes 
more likely to perform any action that brings about a similar effect on those objects (Hoppit et al. 
2012).  By this learning process the observer acquires socially the information about the goal to be 
reached. For example, after having observed a model performing a sequence of actions to reach a 
certain goal, chimpanzees try to reach the same result but using different actions, thus they do not copy 
the actions of the model (Tomasello 1990). When the demonstrator used a stick to reach a reward, the 
observers were quicker than controls in obtaining the reward, however they did not copy the technique 
used by the model, but learned it individually (Tomasello et al. 1987). According to Tomasello, in this 
learning process, learning about the results facilitates acquisition. Whiten and Ham (1992) define 
imitation as learning some parts of the form of a behaviour by observing a demonstrator, thus, 
according to this definition, goal emulation would be a case of imitation limited to the last part of the 
behavioural sequence. Whiten and Ham (1992) have used the term goal emulation to indicate the case 
in which the observer recognizes that the behaviour of the demonstrator has certain consequences and 
that these could be reached also by different actions than those performed by the demonstrator. Horner 
and Whiten (2005) suggest that when the observer understands the causal structure of a task, he uses 
emulation, while when this understanding is lacking he uses imitation. Mitchell (1987) describes a 
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similar process, which he calls fourth level imitation, in which the organism is not bound to reproduce 
the model, but recognizes the relationship between action and goal and copies to its own end. Whether 
goal emulation implies recognising the other’s goals and thus should be considered a more complex 
process than imitation is an issue that is still debated (e.g. Froese and Leavens 2014). However, as 
emulation involves learning socially the goal to be reached, a clearer categorization from the 
behavioural point of view would consider emulation all the cases in which the observer learns socially 
about the goal and reaches it by performing different actions and leave the label of imitation to those 
instances in which the observer learns about both the goal and the actions and consequently reaches the 
same goal as the demonstrator, also using similar actions.  
 
Imitation: 
The study of imitation has always been regarded with mixed feelings and the use of this term with 
different meanings has a long history: while Darwin and its contemporaries used the term ‘imitation’ to 
refer to blind and mindless copying, since the end of the 19th century, most students of animal 
behaviour have used this term to indicate a cognitively complex form of social learning that requires 
some form of cross-modal matching which, in turn, is believed to rely on sophisticated cognitive 
processes. Imitative learning has been considered a ‘special’ ability (Whiten 1998) that involves some 
typically human features (Csibra and Gergely 2005). Thorndike (1898, 1911) defined imitation as 
learning to perform an act by seeing it done and claimed that imitative learning exists only in humans 
and maybe in other primates. In the past, the comparative psychologists looking for experimental 
evidence of imitation in non-human animals found it only in a certain number of cases (e.g. Warden 
and Jackson 1935; Church 1957, Dawson and Foss 1965). Whiten and Ham (1992) defined it as 
learning some part of the form of a behaviour by observing another animal. Thorpe (1963) defined it as 
the acquisition of a novel or otherwise improbable action in the observer as a result of observation of 
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this action in another individual. He suggested that this term should be used only in the case of song 
imitation in birds if the acquired vocalization does not have a big instinctive component and also in the 
cases in which an otherwise improbable action is performed. More recently Zentall (2006) even 
proposed an approach that attempts to control for the presence of all the non-imitative factors and 
considers any matching behaviour that is left as evidence of imitation. This way, imitation is given a 
negative definition, which does not help the reader’s understanding of what a subject learns imitatively 
(only what is not imitation is actually defined). However, if we consider the various learning processes 
from the point of view of what is learned by the observer, it would be agreed by most authors that, 
while in the non-imitative processes of social learning the observer acquires information about the 
stimuli, the objects, the environment or the events in the environment (e.g. local enhancement and 
observational conditioning), through imitation the observer learns from the model something about the 
actions.  
Regarding the development of imitative abilities, much research has focused on humans. According to 
Piaget (1962) the sensory-motor stage of human development produces the ability to imitate. Children 
learn to coordinate visual inputs with motor outputs so that they can reach for objects that they can see 
and would be able of transparent imitation (e.g. scratching one’s arm). However imitating ‘opaque’ 
actions (e.g. scratching one’s own head) would require additional processes such as visualising the 
appearance of one’s own head and it is not clear how this would happen (Zentall 2006).  
 
1.2 Dogs’ social learning abilities 
Dogs represent a particularly interesting species for the study of hetero-specific social learning abilities 
(Kubinyi et al. 2009) as they have undergone selection for living in human groups through 
domestication and these changes contributed to form a species with surprisingly complex social skills 
(Hare et al. 2002; Miklósi et al. 2003; Miklósi et al. 2007; Miklósi and Soproni 2006; Reid 2009; 
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Miklósi and Topál 2013). According to this view dogs were selected to show reduced human-directed 
fear and aggression, which in turn lead them to acceptance of humans as social partners. As a 
consequence, dogs evolved the ability to use intraspecific social skills with humans (Hare and 
Tomasello 2005). 
 
1.2.1 Social learning in dogs 
In the past some controversial findings about social learning from conspecifics in dogs were reported: 
while Thorndike (1898) found that dogs failed to solve socially some manipulative tasks and Brodgen 
(1942) did not find evidence of a quicker acquisition of a conditioned response after observation of a 
similarly conditioned dog, Adler and Adler (1977) and Slabbert and Rasa (1997) found evidence of 
social learning from conspecifics in dogs, respectively in a string pulling task and in a drug search task. 
Now there is strong evidence that dogs can learn socially both from con- and heterospecifics 
demonstrators and a wide consensus has been reached about their ability and predisposition to benefit 
from interactions with both conspecifics and humans. Species-typical (e.g. contagion), perceptual (e.g. 
local and stimulus enhancement) and motivational (social facilitation) factors have been repeatedly 
shown to produce matching behaviour or to help an observer dog to accomplish a given task. For 
example dogs can learn by observing humans in detour tests and manipulative tasks (Pongrácz et al. 
2001, 2003, 2012; Kubinyi et al. 2003) and are easily influenced by humans in observational learning 
situations (Kupán et al. 2010). The selection for living in human social groups might therefore have 
favoured also their general ability to learn socially from humans. Recent results from Range and 
Virányi (2013) partially support this hypothesis by showing that, in a local enhancement task, in a 
control condition without food, dogs look longer than wolves towards a human demonstrator who does 
not carry food but goes to a target location with empty hands, thus showing more ‘a priori’ interest in 
humans than wolves. This is only indirect evidence because looking as a measure of attention is only 
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one requisite for social learning to occur. Further studies could investigate on the possibility that dogs 
are more predisposed than wolves to learn socially from humans and eventually in what situations. 
 
1.2.2 Imitation in dogs 
Unfortunately there is much less agreement regarding the question whether observational 
conditioning, emulation and especially imitation are within the range of dogs’ cognitive abilities. Some 
contrasting results can be found in different experiments: in an experiment in which dogs observed a 
demonstrator pushing a handle to the left or to the right to obtain a ball, Kubinyi et al. (2003) found that 
dogs in the experimental group touched the handle sooner than controls but did not find a significant 
direction matching effect. Miller et al. (2009) found that dogs matched the direction of the 
demonstration when a demonstrator dog pushed a screen more often than when the screen moved 
independently in presence of a passive dog, while their direction matching did not differ whether the 
demonstrator was a human or the screen moved independently while a human was present. However, 
the experimental design of this study may not provide an effective control for other perceptual factors, 
such as local enhancement. Particularly, simply going to the same side of the screen enables dog to 
push only to the same direction as the demonstrator.  
Range et al. (2011) trained dogs to open a box using two different body parts: head or paw. One group 
was then rewarded to use the same body action as demonstrated by the owner, while the other group 
was rewarded for using the different action. This last group, which was required to counter-imitate was 
slower than the other. This result is consistent with automatic imitation in humans (Heyes et al. 2005) 
and budgerigars (Mui et al. 2008), which implies a difficulty to inhibit the tendency to perform the 
same movement at the same time as demonstrator. Gergely et al. (2002) found that children can 
understand what is the action to be performed given the constraints of the demonstrator’s situation and 
similar results were found also in dogs (Range et al. 2007). In latter study a model dog was trained to 
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perform a goal-directed action using a body movement (pull using a paw), which differs from what 
dogs who learn the task individually do (pull using their mouth). Whether observer dogs imitate the 
demonstrated body movement or not depends on whether the model’s mouth was free or not at the time 
of demonstration. Thus dogs were shown to copy the action of the demonstrator selectively, according 
to the constraints of the demonstrator’s situation, showing the ability to inhibit such automatic imitation 
described above and to choose instead the most efficient strategy (selective imitation). Accordingly 
dogs’ behaviour seems to be goal-directed and they optimize their behaviour on the basis of efficiency 
(but see also Kaminski et al. 2010).  
Topál et al. (2006) were the first to use the Do as I do paradigm with a dog and discovered that dogs 
are able to match functionally their behaviour to actions shown by a human demonstrator. These results 
were later replicated and extended by Huber et al. (2009). With the Do as I Do procedure, dogs first 
learn to match their behaviour to a small set of familiar actions with operant conditioning methods and 
later are able to generalize the ‘copying rule’ to other actions and demonstrators, thus they can be tested 
for imitation in various situations. Due to the differences in the behaviour repertoire of humans and 
dogs, their matching behaviours were described as ‘functional imitation’ because the dog reaches the 
same goal as the demonstrator taken into account the differences in the behaviour repertoire of the two 
species when performing similar actions (e.g., if the human demonstrator grabs an object using his 
hand, the dog grabs it using his mouth). 
Tennie et al. (2009) failed to find evidence for imitation of intransitive actions in dogs. Observer 
dogs were exposed to an interaction between a human and a model dog in which the human rewarded 
the model dog for performing body movements that were familiar to the observer. The observer dogs 
were later tested to find evidence of copying the model’s action. In this setup the observer dogs did not 
outperform controls. One possible explanation for this result is that dogs lack the cognitive ability to 
copy intransitive actions. In fact it seems that for many species these actions are more difficult to 
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imitate than transitive actions (Huber 2009). However it is probable that this experimental procedure 
did not allow dogs to understand that they were required to attend the interaction and to copy the action 
of the demonstrator. For this reason it is preferable to use the Do as I do protocol if one aims at testing 
imitative abilities. With this method it is unquestionable that the subject learns that he is required to 
imitate, thus it is possible to test its imitative ability without incurring in other methodological, 
attentional and/or motivational confounding factors. 
 
1.3 Specifying the mental mechanisms of imitative behaviour and methodological issues 
Lloyd Morgan’s canon is usually taken by researchers to justify that, when animal behaviour can be 
explained by two different psychological processes and these processes vary in complexity, it is 
legitimate to assume that the behaviour relies on the less complex option. On the other extreme, there is 
a trend in certain areas of research to assume that animals engage in cognitive processes (e.g., animals 
‘understand’ particular aspects of the world, such as causality, intentions, cooperation etc.), which 
imply that they form mental representations. The problematic issue with this interpretation occurs if 
these ‘super cognitive’ interpretations are taken as the default explanation of the observed behaviour, 
without proper controls for other possible mechanisms. As stated by Heyes (2012) it is necessary to 
steer a course between these two extremes because, on one hand, even Morgan failed to give a proper 
justification for its canon and also subsequent attempts to justify it by evolutionary arguments were 
fallacious. The main problem of Morgan’s argument is that it implies a ranking of cognitive functions 
that is far from being straightforward (Heyes 2012; Sober 1998). Also the evolutionary consideration 
that super cognitive processes are more costly and require larger brains cannot be taken as a 
justification of the use of Morgan’s canon as a general principle because it cut both ways: in some 
cases evolutionary considerations would favor cognitive interpretations (e.g. for species that evolved in 
complex social environment). 
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In contrast, associative learning is widespread among all species, including humans and also some 
complex psychological mechanisms have been shown to rely on associations (e.g., Kaufam et al. 2012; 
Moore et al. 2011; Prados et al. 2011). Thus associative learning, as well as all the possible simpler 
alternative explanations of behaviour, should be considered as contenders of the more cognitive ones, 
but not the default and each study should include the proper controls to exclude (or confirm) the 
possible alternative hypothesis.  
 
1.3.1 Experimental methods 
Also in the domain of social learning, when behavioural similarity between two individuals is 
observed, it is necessary to exclude other processes (e.g., perceptual factors such as local and stimulus 
enhancement), before assuming the presence of the ability to imitate. Therefore two-action or multi-
action experiments (Dawson and Foss 1965) have become recognised methods (e.g., Akins and Zentall 
1996; van de Waal et al. 2012) to test imitative abilities because they control for other non-imitative 
processes that may increase the probability of a similar response by the observer, such as local 
enhancement (Thorpe 1963), stimulus enhancement (Galef 1988) and goal emulation (Wood 1989; 
Tomasello 1990). In fact the use of the two-action procedure allows finding evidence of imitation or, 
alternatively, of other non-imitative processes because these are spelled out in sufficient detail to make 
differential predictions (e.g. if the behavioural similarity relies on a stimulus enhancement process, the 
subject is expected to match the object used by the demonstrator but not the action, whereas if the 
behavioural similarity relies on imitation the observer is expected to match also the action in terms of 
body movement). For example Dawson and Foss (1965) tested imitation in budgerigars allowing 
observers to watch a conspecific that performed one of three different actions to open a lid of a 
container of food. The observers matched their behaviour with that of the demonstrators, performing 
mainly the action that was shown by the demonstrator in each condition.  
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In order to control for non-imitative processes, some authors (e.g. Heyes and Dawson 1990; Miller 
et al. 2009) used the so-called bidirectional procedure in which a manipolandum is moved by the model 
either in one direction or in the opposite one. In this case it is assumed that, if the observer moves the 
object in the same direction as the demonstration, he is imitating. Miller et al. (2009) also introduced a 
condition in which the manipolandum is moved remotely, without demonstration, which is a control for 
goal emulation. While some authors consider the bidirectional procedure as a good control for non-
imitative processes, it can be argued that the movement of the object in space, the position of the 
demonstrator and the part of the object manipulated may have a local enhancement effect and then, the 
mere fact of contacting that part of the object, due to this effect, provokes the movement in the 
matching direction. Furthermore, matching the direction is not conceptually equal to matching the 
action in terms of body movement (e.g., the object could be pushed on the right by using muzzle or 
paw) and, as discussed above, imitation regards mainly learning socially about actions.  
An effective method for studying imitation is the Do as I do paradigm, originally used by Hayes and 
Hayes (1952) to test imitative abilities in a home raised chimpanzee. With this method the subject is 
first trained to match a small set of familiar actions to the demonstration and then is tested on its ability 
to use this ‘imitation rule’ with various behaviours and situations. The main advantage of this method 
is that the subject is specifically trained to imitate, thus other confounding factors (e.g., motivation, the 
possibility to rely on other processes) can be excluded. The Do as I do method has proven efficient as a 
mean to test imitation, not only in chimpanzees (Custance et al. 1995; Call 2001), but also in some 
other species: dolphins (Herman 2002), parrots (Moore 1993) and more recently also dogs (Topál et al. 
2006).  
  
1.4 Aims of the present research and hypotheses 
The present research focuses on two different topics: (1) a cognitive issue regarding dogs’ ability of 
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deferred imitation and memory of human actions and (2) an applied issue concerning the efficiency of 
the use of social learning in dog training. 
(1) From a cognitive perspective, particularly interesting is the question whether dogs would be 
able to replicate human actions after a delay (deferred imitation), which would exclude other 
facilitative process that may trigger behavioural similarity between model and observer at the 
same time. The ability of imitating an action after a delay implies that the observer creates a 
representation of the demonstration, encodes it and recalls it after a delay to use it as the basis 
to perform a similar action (Study 1). Modifying the conditions of the environment during the 
recall phase it is also possible to assess what information the observer encodes and retains 
better among spatial information about the location of demonstration, figurative information 
about the object used during the demonstration and/or the information about the body 
movement performed by the model (Study 2). 
(2) The dog training methods traditionally rely on the principles of individual associative learning. 
However, recently the Do as I do method has been introduced in the applied field of dog 
training (Fugazza 2011). With this method dogs are first trained to match their behaviour to a 
small set of familiar actions and then their ability to generalize this rule to novel actions is 
used for training purposes (i.e. teaching them novel behaviours). Study 3 focuses on the 
assessment of the efficiency of this method that relies on social learning as compared to a 
method that relies on individual learning to teach dogs specific kinds of novel actions. 
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2 Study 1: Deferred imitation in domestic dogs 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The ability to encode, retain and retrieve a memory of a demonstration and then to use it as the basis 
to reproduce the demonstrated action after a delay is defined as deferred imitation (Klein and Meltzoff 
1999). Already Piaget (1952) regarded this ability as a hallmark of mental representation of movements 
because it indicates the emergence of the infant’s ability to form a mental representation of the model’s 
actions at the time of demonstration and recall of that image after a retention interval (Barr et al. 1996). 
From a cognitive point of view, evidence for deferred imitation rules out alternative hypothesis of 
the mechanism behind behavioural similarity between individuals in which the demonstration triggers a 
similar behaviour in the observer at the same time or shortly after it (e.g. contagion). It is generally 
agreed that an interval of one minute between demonstration and performance is sufficiently long to 
exclude that the observer performs a similar action because this is primed by the demonstration, like a 
reflexive response, which is thought to be responsible for behavioural similarity that occurs at the same 
time as demonstration (e.g., Zentall 2006). Accordingly, imitative behaviour after one minute is 
considered as deferred imitation. 
Recently Topál et al. (2006) used the ‘Do as I do’ procedure (Hayes and Hayes 1952) and 
discovered that dogs possess the ability to match functionally their behaviour to a human demonstration. 
However Huber et al. (2009) found that the dog’s matching degree declined when the delay interposed 
between the demonstration and the ‘Do it!’ command was increased: the dog that was tested could 
perform correctly with delays shorter than 5 seconds and only in one occasion she could copy a 
familiar action after a delay of 35 seconds. Thus dogs may not be able to display deferred imitation. 
Nevertheless this negative finding could be due to problems with the experimental procedure used. It is 
likely that through the ‘Do as I do’ training as applied by Topál et al. (2006) and Huber et al. (2009), 
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the dog learns that he is required to match the action that has been shown immediately before the ‘Do 
it!’ command. In this case dogs trained with this method would not have learned that they were 
expected to copy the demonstration that was shown before an interval.  
Thus in this study we investigated whether dogs possess the cognitive ability of deferred imitation 
and, in order to exclude the possible methodological issues describe above, the dogs were first trained 
by their owners with the ‘Do as I do’ method and then, before the testing begun, they were trained to 
wait for short retention intervals (from 5 to 30 seconds) before the owners gave the ‘Do it!’ command 
to ask them to copy the observed action. This way we taught dogs that the ‘Do it!’ command referred to 
the demonstration that was shown before an interval. In the subsequent testing phase, the dogs 
participated in a series of tests aimed at investigating (1) their generalisation ability, (2) deferred 
imitation, (3) emulative learning. 
We first investigated on dogs’ ability to reproduce actions shown by a human demonstrator after 
intervals of different durations (from 0.40 to 10 minutes). We also included distractions during the 
delays in order to prevent dogs from keeping their mind active on the demonstration. In fact, by 
engaging the subjects in a different activity, the ability to encode and recall the demonstrated action can 
be tested excluding the possibility that their matching behaviour relies on the keeping their mind active 
on the demonstration for the whole duration of the retention interval.  
Barnat et al. (1996) tested the influence of changes in context on deferred imitation in human infants. 
The subjects were shown demonstrations of object-related actions in a context and were later given the 
opportunity to imitate in a different context and with objects that had some different features from 
those used during the demonstration. The results showed that combined changes in context and object 
features led to a significant decrease in the infants’ imitative performances, suggesting that context and 
object features serve as a retrieval cues that help recalling the demonstration. To assess if dogs’ 
imitative abilities are affected by changes in context, in the second part of the testing, we tested them 
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giving the ‘Do it!’ command in a different location from that of the demonstration.  
In order to control for non-imitative processes that may enhance the probability of behavioural 
similarity, such as local enhancement (Thorpe 1963), stimulus enhancement (Galef 1988) and goal 
emulation (Wood 1989; Tomasello 1990) we used the two-action procedure, also because earlier 
studies on imitation in dogs (Topál et al. 2006, Huber et al. 2009) did not explicitly test for such 
alternative explanations. We used two two-action tests that differed in the kind of information provided 
to the dogs: in the first two-action test, the two actions on the same object did not lead to different 
outcomes, so that goal emulation could not be used to solve the task. In the second two-action test, the 
demonstrators achieved two different outcomes on the same object. If dogs were only able to engage in 
deferred emulation but not in deferred imitation, we expected them to perform correctly only when two 
different outcomes were presented, but not to succeed when different actions without different 
outcomes were shown. 
Finally, we included a test to control for Clever Hans effect and a test in absence of demonstration. 
 
2.2 Material and methods 
2.2.1 Subjects 
The subjects in our study consisted of 8 adult pet dogs ranging from 2 to 10 years old and their owners 
who volunteered to participate in this experiment. The dogs were females of various breeds (4 border 
collies, 1 Shetland sheepdog, 1 Yorkshire terrier, 1 Czechoslovakian wolfdog, and 1 mixed breed).  
Before the study began, all the subjects had previously been trained by their owners with the ‘Do as I 
do’ method to match their behaviour to demonstrated actions (based on Topál et al. 2006, see below). 
 
2.2.2 Training phase 
Preliminary ‘Do as I do’ training (based on Topál et al. 2006): 
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The training protocol had been previously explained to all the owners by the experimenter (C.F.) before 
the study began and consisted of two phases: 
Phase 1. The dogs learned to match their behaviour to 3 demonstrated familiar (i.e., already trained) 
actions using the ‘Do it!’ command through operant conditioning techniques. Each owner could decide 
what actions to use for the training. Once the dogs reached approximately 80% of correct performance 
in at least two sessions in a row, they began the second training phase. 
Phase 2. The dogs learned to match their behaviour to 6 demonstrated familiar actions using the ‘Do it!’ 
command (in the training sessions 3 other familiar actions were added to the 3 used in phase 1). Both in 
phase 1 and 2 owners could decide what actions to use for the training, the only requisite being that 
they had to be already trained actions. The owners typically used both object related actions and body 
movements. 
The owners were allowed to train the dogs at home and were instructed to reward the dog using food 
or access to favourite toys only if their behaviour after the ‘Do it!’ command corresponded to the action 
that had been demonstrated. The definition of correspondence was based on Topál et al. 2006: the 
action that the dog performed immediately after the ‘Do it!’ command was considered as functionally 
matching the demonstration if it entailed the same goal and, given the species-specific differences in 
the behaviour repertoire of the two species, was executed in a similar way (figure 1). 
The owners were instructed to train their dogs two to three times per week in a single training session 
lasting no more than 5 minutes. A single training session typically included six to ten trials but owners 
were not given restrictions about the number of trials. 
The training of the dogs lasted on average approximately one month, but the duration varied from two 
to seven weeks according to the time devoted by owners to the training. 
Once the dogs reached 80% of correct performance with the 6 familiar actions, owners were allowed to 
train their dogs to perform novel actions using this training technique. 
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Preliminary training for deferred imitation: 
Before the testing began, all subjects went through a training phase aimed at teaching dogs that the ‘Do 
it!’ command now referred to the action that had been demonstrated after the ‘Stay’ command, even if: 
1) an interval elapsed between the demonstration and the ‘Do it!’ command and 2) the demonstrator 
performed other actions during the interval (i.e., walked in another direction). The procedure was as 
follows: 
Owners made their dog stay in place while facing them and made them pay attention using cues known 
by the dog. Next the owners demonstrated a familiar object-related action. Then they returned to the 
starting position in front of their dog and waited for 5 seconds while looking straight ahead, before 
giving the ‘Do it!’ command. Dogs were rewarded using food or access to favourite toys only if their 
behaviour after the ‘Do it!’ command corresponded to the action that had been demonstrated. In case of 
failure the procedure was repeated. 
When the dogs were successful with this short delay in at least two trials in a row, owners increased the 
delay up to 10 seconds, repeating the same procedure. When dogs were successful with this delay in at 
least two trials in a row, owners were instructed to perform the demonstration and then walk with their 
dogs during increasingly longer delays, before returning to the starting position and giving the ‘Do it!’ 
command. The delay was gradually increased to approximately 30 seconds to allow owners to walk 
with their dog behind a curtain positioned at 14 m from the objects, before returning to the starting 
position and giving the ‘Do it!’ command (Figure 2). 
Owners trained the dogs in two different dog schools. They admitted the dog to the following testing 
procedure once they or the trainer who controlled the training procedure reported that the dogs could 
functionally match their behaviour to the demonstration of familiar actions in two trials in a row with a 
delay of 30 seconds. 
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Figure 1 Example of functional imitation: the owner demonstrates touching an object with hand and 
the dog’s behaviour is scored a ‘match’ if it touches the object with his front paw (Photo: Claudia 
Fugazza in Horowitz 2014) 
 
2.2.3 Testing phase 
The testing took place at the same two dog schools where the dogs were trained, in outdoor fenced 
areas. Before the testing, owners completed a list of all the actions that were already familiar to their 
dogs (i.e., the dogs were already trained to perform those actions either with traditional training 
methods or with the Do as I do method). For each subject we randomly picked five object-related 
actions from this list to use in those testing conditions where familiar actions were demonstrated. Thus 
in the Familiar action conditions dogs were randomly shown actions that, either were part of their 
training repertoire but had never been used in the Do as I do framework, or were used for the Do as I 
do training.  
In each test and for each dog, three object-related actions were randomly chosen out of those five for 
the Familiar action condition, Distracting condition and Changed context condition and three 
completely novel object-related actions were presented in the Novel action condition and in the Two-
action tests (Table 1). The relative position of the objects on which the demonstration was performed 
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(centre, right, left) was also randomized, their distance being 3.5 m from each other. The curtain used 
to prevent dogs from looking at the target object during the retention interval was placed at a distance 
of 14 m from the objects (Figure 2). 
The owners taking part in the tests helped to prepare the setting (i.e., they carried all the objects to the 
predetermined position). This was done to exclude that dogs could rely on olfactory cues for their 
performances, as all the objects were previously manipulated by the owners.  
At the beginning of each trial, the owner made the dog stay at the same place (using verbal commands 
and hand gestures known by the dog) and demonstrated a randomly chosen object-related action. After 
the demonstration, dog and owner walked behind the curtain in order to prevent the dog from looking 
at the target object. When the predetermined retention interval elapsed, the experimenter told the owner 
to go back to the starting position and, having reached this position, the owner gave the ‘Do it!’ 
command to the dog while looking straight ahead. For the analysis, the length of the delay in each 
condition was calculated from the demonstration to the ‘Do it!’ command and could slightly vary (± 30 
seconds) according to the walking speed of each owner and dog when they went back from behind the 
curtain to the starting position. 
Dogs were tested in different periods, according to their owners’ availability for the testing. For each 
subject an interval of at least 30 minutes passed between two consecutive tests and the maximum 
number of tests per day was 4. The maximum interval between two consecutive tests for one dog was 
53 days. 
Each dog went through the same testing protocol (Table 2) consisting of 19 tests in eight different 
conditions (one trial per delay) in the following detailed order:  
Familiar action: Eight tests on familiar actions with different retention intervals (durations of retention 
intervals: 0.40 min; 1 min; 1.5 min; 2 min; 3 min; 4 min; 6 min; 10 min). 
Novel action: Three novel objects were placed in randomized positions and the dogs were tested on a 
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novel action (enter a wooden box) with a retention interval of 1 min. 
Distracting action: In five tests the dogs observed the demonstration of a familiar action and were then 
distracted during the retention interval, before the ‘Do it!’ command was given (in 3 tests owners 
distracted them by giving a different command ‘lay down’, with retention intervals of 0.50 min; 3 min; 
4 min; and in two tests owners distracted the dogs by throwing a ball and encouraging them to fetch it, 
with retention intervals of 1 min and 4 min).  
Changed context: Owners demonstrated a familiar action at one location, then walked with their dog to 
another location where 3 identical objects were placed in similar respective positions and gave the ‘Do 
it!’ command (retention interval: 1 min). 
‘Clever Hans’ control: A single test with the same procedure as the Familiar action condition, except 
that after the demonstration by the owner, he and the dog walked behind the curtain, where there was a 
familiar person who had not witnessed the demonstration, thus did not know what action was shown to 
the dog. After a retention interval of 1.15 minutes, this naive person went with the dog to the 
predetermined starting position and gave the ‘Do it!’ command in absence of the owner who stayed 
behind the curtain. 
No demonstration control: Two novel objects (a tube placed in vertical position and an umbrella stand) 
and the wooden box (already used in the Novel action condition) were placed at randomized positions. 
The owner commanded the dog to stay in the usual starting position and to pay attention as was done in 
the other tests. The owner remained still for 5 seconds and then gave the ‘Do it!’ command to the dog. 
After the command the owner was instructed to keep looking straight ahead for the duration of the test. 
The behaviour of the dog was video recorded for 30 seconds after the ‘Do it!’ command. 
Two-action on box: The setting was the same as in the No demonstration control test. Three dogs were 
shown an action on the box and the other 5 dogs were shown a different action on the box. The 
demonstrations were ‘Look inside the box’ and ‘Touch the box with hand’ respectively. The two 
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actions lead to the same outcome (i.e., the box did not move). If the dog was already familiar with the 
action of ‘Muzzle in the bucket’ then we showed ‘Touch the box with hand’ to him because we 
suspected that ‘Look inside the box’ would have been similar to the already familiar action. The 
retention interval was 1.30 minutes. 
Two-action on tube: The setting was the same as in the No demonstration control condition. Half of the 
dogs were shown an action on the tube and the other half of the dogs were shown a different action on 
the tube. The actions were ‘Walk around the tube from the left side to the right’ and ‘Knock over the 
tube’ (retention interval: 1.30 min). In this case the two demonstrations lead to different outcomes (the 
tube stayed in its vertical position when the experimenter walked around or the tube fell to a horizontal 
position when it was knocked over and was then repositioned by the experimenter while the dog and 
the owner were behind the curtain). For this test the assignment of the subjects to the groups was 
randomized. 
The testing sessions were recorded by two video cameras placed in two different positions in order to 
always have a view of the dog and the owner. 
 
Figure 2 Experimental setting: the dog is facing the owner in the starting position 4.5 m away from the 
objects; three objects on which actions can be demonstrated are placed in predetermined randomized 
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positions at a distance of 3.5 m from each other; the curtain used to obstruct the view of the objects 
during the retention interval is behind the owner at a distance of 14 m from the objects. 
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Name of the 
behaviour 
Description of the owner’s 
demonstration 
Description of the expected dog’s 
behaviour 
FAMILIAR 
ACTIONS: 
  
 
Walk around bucket 
 
The owner walks around a bucket 
placed on the ground 
 
The dog walks around a bucket 
placed on the ground 
 
Muzzle in bucket The owner puts his face in a bucket 
placed on the ground 
The dog puts her muzzle in a bucket 
placed on the ground 
 
Put muzzle in 
colander 
The owner puts his face in a 
colander placed on the ground 
The dog puts her muzzle in a 
colander placed on the ground 
 
Climb on chair The owner climbs with his feet on a 
chair 
The dog climbs with all fours on a 
chair 
 
Touch chair The owner touches the seat of a 
chair with his hands 
The dog touches the seat of the 
chair with her front paw 
 
Walk around cone The owner walks around a cone 
placed on the ground 
The dog walks around a cone 
placed on the ground 
 
Touch cone The owner touches with his hand a 
plastic cone that is placed on the 
ground 
The dog touches with her front paw 
a plastic cone that is placed on the 
ground  
 
Pull rolling toy The owner pulls a string attached to 
a children’s toy with wheels using 
his hand and makes it move on the 
ground 
The dog takes in her mouth a string 
attached to a children’s toy with 
wheels and pulls it making it move 
on the ground 
 
Ring bell The owner rings a bell that is 
hanging from a bar 
The dog rings a bell that is hanging 
from a bar 
 
On table The owner climbs on an agility 
table 
The dog jumps on an agility table 
 
 
Hoop The owner puts his feet and hands 
in a hoop placed on the ground 
The dog puts her four paws in a 
hoop placed on the ground 
 
Open box The owner removes the lid of a box 
using his hand 
The dog removes the lid of a box 
using her mouth 
 
Touch stool The owner touches a small stool 
with his hand 
The dog touches a small tool with 
her front paw 
 
Drop bottle The owner touches a bottle that is 
placed on the ground using his hand 
and makes it fall 
The dog touches a bottle that is 
placed on the ground using her front 
paw and makes it fall 
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Take object The owner takes with his hand one 
of two objects that are placed on a 
chair 
The dog takes the other object that 
is placed on the chair with her 
mouth 
 
Jump in high 
packaging box 
The owner steps inside a cartoon 
packaging box raising his legs to 
enter in it 
The dog jumps inside the packaging 
box 
 
 
 Roll ball The owner touches a ball and 
makes it roll 
The dog touches a ball and makes 
roll 
 
Swing hanging object The owner touches with his hand a 
toy that is hanging from a hurdle 
The dog touches with his front paw 
a toy that is hanging from a hurdle 
 
Touch target The owner touches with his hand a 
small pad on the ground 
The dog touches with her front paw 
a small pad on the ground 
 
Jump over hurdle The owner jumps over a hurdle The dog jumps over a hurdle 
 
__________________ 
NOVEL ACTIONS: 
 
  
Enter wooden box The owners puts his feet and hands 
in a wooden box 
The dog enters in a wooden box 
with her all fours 
 
Look inside wooden 
box 
The owner looks inside a wooden 
box 
The dog looks inside a wooden box 
 
 
Touch wooden box The owner touches a wooden box 
with hand 
The dog touches a wooden box with 
her front paw 
 
Knock over tube The owner knocks over a cartoon 
tube placed vertically on the ground 
using hand 
The dog knocks over a cartoon tube 
placed vertically on the ground 
using her front paw 
 
Walk around tube The owner walks around a cartoon 
tube placed vertically on the 
ground, moving from left to right 
The dog walks around a cartoon 
tube placed vertically on the 
ground, moving from left to right 
 
Table 1 Behaviours used for the testing, description of the human demonstration and description of the 
expected dog’s behaviour 
 
 
  
 34 
2.2.4 Data collection and analysis 
The actions of the dogs after the ‘Do it!’ command were coded by the experimenter as ‘match’ (the dog 
performs an action that is functionally similar to the demonstrated task) or ‘no match’ (the dog 
performs any other action). In the conditions where novel actions were demonstrated (Novel action, 
Two-action on box and Two-action on tube) the behaviour of the dog was scored as matching only if 
there was a correspondence in both the goal (if a goal was present) and the body movement, taken into 
account the differences in the body schema of dogs and humans (i.e., a human’s hand touch was 
considered corresponding to a dog’s front paw touch). In the conditions where familiar actions were 
demonstrated, a mere functional correspondence was used as criterion because the expected response of 
the dog was already known since these were trained actions. 
In addition to the main coder (C.F.) an independent observer coded 30% of the videos in order to assess 
inter-observer reliability. The calculation of the Kappa coefficient yielded K=1. 
The results were analysed using GraphPad software by comparing performances between the different 
conditions and the No demonstration control test using Fisher’s exact test with α level at 0.05. However, 
since each testing condition was planned to answer a specific theoretical question, we used the 
Bonferroni correction taking into account the number of ‘Do as I do’ tests performed within a specific 
condition.   
 
2.3 Results and discussion 
In the No demonstration control condition no dog performed any action on the objects present in the 
testing area, all dogs but one did not perform any action at all for at least 5 seconds after the ‘Do it!’ 
command, which is matching with the demonstration (the owner did not perform any action for 5 
seconds). One dog remained in a sitting position for the duration of the video recording (30 seconds) 
but slightly raised a paw 2 seconds after the ‘Do it!’ command was given. Three dogs did not move for 
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the whole duration of the test, one dog did not move for 20 seconds and then stood up, one dog 
remained in place but barked, one dog moved a little backward while remaining in a sitting position 
and one dog remained in a sitting position for 5 seconds and then ran away to play and then sniffed the 
ground. 
We compared performances between the different conditions and the No demonstration control using 
Fisher’s exact test. In the Familiar action condition the subjects were tested with eight different 
retention intervals and the Bonferroni corrected α level is 0.00625. Comparing the number of correct 
performances of the demonstrated action after the different delays with the No demonstration 
condition, we found a statistically significant difference for the tests with delays of 0.40, 1, 1.5, 2, 4 
and 10 minutes (Fisher’s exact test, respectively: P=0.0014, P=0.0002, P=0.0014, P=0.0002, P=0.0014 
and P=0.0002, respectively), while for the tests with 3 and 6 minutes delays the difference was not 
significant after the Bonferroni correction (P=0.007).  
Subjects were tested two times on their memory of novel actions on the box (i.e., all dogs were tested 
on ‘Enter the box’ and then some of them were tested on ‘Touch the box with hand/front paw’ and 
some of them on ‘Look inside the box’ in the subsequent Two-action test on box in which all dogs 
performed the demonstrated action). In this case the Bonferroni corrected α level is 0.025 and there is a 
significant difference between all the performance and the No demonstration condition (‘Enter the 
box’: P=0.0014; ‘Touch the box with paw’ and ‘Look inside the box’: P=0.0002). The dogs’ 
performances was also significantly different from the No demonstration condition in the Two-action 
test on tube (P=0.0014) in which only one dog performed a different action (entered the box) before 
performing the action that had been demonstrated (‘Knock over the tube’) and was scored as ‘no 
match’. 
In the Distracting action condition dogs were tested with two different distractions in overall five tests 
with different delays and the Bonferroni corrected α level is 0.01. All the performances showed a 
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significant difference from the No demonstration condition (Distraction: ‘Lay down’ with 1 minute 
delay: P=0.0002; with 3 and 4 minutes delay: P=0.0014; Distraction: ‘Play with ball’ with 1 minute 
delay: P=0.0002 and with 4 minutes delay: P=0.007, respectively). 
In the Changed context and Clever Hans conditions the dogs were only tested with one delay, so we did 
not use the Bonferroni correction for the statistical analysis. We found a significant difference between 
the dogs’ performance in those conditions and the performance in the No demonstration condition 
(Changed context: P=0.0014 and Clever Hans: P=0.0002). 
Fisher’s exact test was used to compare each different condition to the Familiar action condition to 
assess if the matching performance changes with the increased delays, with the introduction of 
distractions, when changing the context of retrieval or when demonstrating novel actions. First, in order 
to assess if the increased delay affects the performance, we compared with each other the results 
obtained after different delay durations in the Familiar action condition (e.g., comparing the 
performance of dogs with 1 minute delay with their performance with 10 minutes delay) and no 
comparison reached the level of significance (P=0.4667 for the comparison of the performance after 
delays of 3 and 6 minutes compared to the performance after delays of 1, 2 and 10 minutes and 
P=1.000 for the comparisons with all the other delay durations) (Figure 3a). Second, we compared the 
performance of the dogs in the Familiar action condition with their performance in the Distracting 
condition with respectively similar delays and no comparison reached the level of significance 
(P=1.000 for all the comparisons). Then we also compared the performance in the Familiar action 
condition after one minute delay with that in the Novel action condition and Changed context condition, 
in which the ‘Do it!’ command was also given after 1 minute delay and not even in this case we found 
significant differences (P=1.000 for both comparisons). The matching performance of the dogs did not 
even change when they were tested for emulation and imitation in the two Two-action tests, compared 
to the test in the Familiar action condition with a similar delay (P=1.000 in both comparisons). 
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Throughout the testing procedure of 18 trials, 6 dogs made only one error, one dog made two errors and 
one dog made 6 errors (for the details see Table 2). Overall 130 (90.28%) trials have been scored as 
‘match’ and 14 as ‘no match’. 
  
 38 
FAMILIAR ACTION CONDITION 
 
DOG’S NAME - BREED RANDOMLY CHOSEN FAMILIAR ACTION 
 
Emma – Shetland Sheepdog Roll ball, Muzzle in colander, Touch stool, Muzzle in colander, 
Muzzle in colander, Touch stool, On table, Muzzle in colander 
 
Phoebe – Border Collie On table, Ring bell, Muzzle in bucket, Touch stool, Touch stool, 
Muzzle in bucket, Touch stool*, Touch stool 
 
Bambù – Border Collie Climb on chair, Muzzle in bucket, Walk around cone*, Climb on 
chair, Jump over hurdle, On table, Climb on chair, On table 
 
Lilly – Yorkshire Terrier Pull rolling toy, Open box, Swing hanging object, Jump in high 
packaging box, Open box*, Drop bottle, Pull rolling toy, Drop 
bottle 
 
Adila – Mixed breed On table*, Ring bell, Touch cone, On table, Ring bell, Touch 
chair, Touch cone, Walk around bucket 
 
Minnie – Border Collie Muzzle in bucket, Touch stool, Muzzle in bucket, On table, On 
table*, Ring bell, On table, Touch stool 
 
Soley – Border Collie Touch chair, Jump over hurdle, On table, Muzzle in bucket, On 
table, Touch chair*, Jump over hurdle*, Touch chair 
 
India - Czechoslovakian Wolfdog Jump over hurdle, Touch chair, Drop bottle, Drop bottle, Touch 
chair, Jump over hurdle, Touch chair, On table 
 
NOVEL ACTION CONDITION 
 
DOG’S NAME NOVEL ACTION 
 
Emma, Phoebe, Bambù, Lilly, 
Adila*, Minnie, Soley, India 
Enter wooden box 
 
 
DISTRACTING ACTION CONDITION (Distraction: lay down command) 
 
DOG’S NAME RANDOMLY CHOSEN FAMILIAR ACTION 
 
Emma Hoop, Roll ball*, Hoop 
 
Phoebe Take object, Ring bell, Take object 
 
Bambù Climb on chair, Muzzle in bucket, Climb on chair 
 
Lilly Swing hanging object, Drop bottle, Pull rolling toy 
 
Adila Touch chair, Walk around bucket, On table 
 
Minnie Take object, Muzzle in bucket, Touch stool 
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Soley Jump over hurdle, Touch chair, On table* 
 
India Drop bottle, On table, Touch chair 
 
DISTRACTING ACTION CONDITION (Distraction: play with ball) 
 
DOG’S NAME RANDOMLY CHOSEN FAMILIAR ACTION 
 
Emma Muzzle in colander, Hoop 
 
Phoebe On table, Take object 
 
Bambù Jump over hurdle, Muzzle in bucket 
 
Lilly Jump in high packaging box, Open box 
 
Adila Ring bell, Touch cone 
 
Minnie On table, Ring bell 
Soley Touch chair*, Walk around cone 
 
India Jump over hurdle, Touch chair* 
 
CHANGED CONTEXT CONDITION 
 
DOG’S NAME RANDOMLY CHOSEN FAMILIAR ACTION 
 
Emma Touch target 
 
Phoebe Muzzle in bucket 
 
Bambù Muzzle in bucket 
 
Lilly Drop bottle 
 
Adila Touch cone 
 
Minnie  Take object 
 
Soley* Walk around cone 
 
India Ring bell 
 
CLEVER HANS CONTROL CONDITION 
 
DOG’S NAME RANDOMLY CHOSEN FAMILIAR ACTION 
 
Emma Roll ball 
 
Phoebe On table 
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Bambù Muzzle in bucket 
 
Lilly Jump in high packaging box 
 
Adila On table 
 
Minnie  Take object 
 
Soley Jump over hurdle 
 
India On table 
 
TWO-ACTION ON BOX CONDITION 
 
DOG’S NAME NOVEL ACTION 
 
Emma, Phoebe, Bambù, Minnie, 
Soley 
Touch box 
 
 
Lilly, Adila, India Look inside box 
 
TWO-ACTION ON TUBE CONDITION 
 
DOG’S NAME NOVEL ACTION 
 
Emma, Phoebe, Minnie, India Walk around tube 
 
Soley*, Lilly, Adila, Bambù Knock over tube 
 
Table 2 Subjects (dog’s name and breed) and actions chosen for each subject in the different testing 
conditions. Wrong performances of the dogs are marked by *. Actions and conditions are listed in the 
actual order of testing. 
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Figure 3 Percentage of dogs’ performances scored as ‘match’ in the different conditions. ** indicate 
statistically significant difference compared to the No demonstration condition after Bonferroni 
correction a. Familiar actions after different delays; b. Familiar actions with distractions during the 
retention interval; c. Novel action after a delay of 1 minute, familiar action in a different context after a 
delay of 1 minute and ‘Do it!’ command given by a different ‘naïve’ experimenter after a delay of 1.15 
minutes; d. Two-action tests on novel actions after a delay of 1.30 minutes. The figure shows that the 
matching percentage does not typically change with increased delays from 0.40 to 10 minutes (2a), 
with the introduction of distractions (2b), when novel actions are demonstrated, changing the context of 
retrieval and in the Clever Hans control test (2c) and when different novel actions on the same objects 
are demonstrated (2d). 
Dogs were typically able to reproduce familiar and novel actions after a delay, also in a different 
context and if distracted by their owners who engaged them in different types of activities before 
recalling the demonstrated action. The robust performance of the dogs in the present study 
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convincingly supports deferred imitation. The ability to encode and recall the demonstration after a 
delay implies that facilitative processes cannot exhaustively explain the observed behavioural similarity 
and that dogs’ imitative abilities are rather based on an enduring mental representation of the 
demonstration. 
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3 Study 2: Dogs’ spatial bias affects their imitative performance in a Do as I do task 
 
3.1 Introduction 
When in Study 1 (Fugazza and Miklósi 2013) we tested dogs by changing the context between 
demonstration phase and recall phase, the respective position of the objects that were present during the 
demonstration remained identical in the recall phase (i.e. when the ‘do it!’ command was given in the 
different context). Thus it is possible that this respective position - i.e., the spatial position where the 
owner acted during the demonstration, respective to the starting point where the dog was positioned - 
might have been an important contextual cue that dogs encoded and later helped them to recall and 
imitate, even in a different context. Alternatively (or additionally), it is also possible that the features of 
the objects on which the demonstration was performed helped recall, serving as a figurative cues to 
help recalling the action. Indeed, dogs may be able to encode information on the physical 
characteristics of objects, such as colour and size (Pattison et. al 2010; Pattison et al. 2013; Muller et al. 
2011). Nonetheless, several studies showed that, when they are forced to choose to rely either on 
figurative information or on spatial information to solve search tasks, dogs tend to use spatial 
information (e.g., Doré et. al 1996; Dumas 1998). 
The aim of the present study is to disentangle what kind of spatial and/or figurative information dogs 
recall (or match) preferentially in a deferred imitation task and to find out the role of spatial and/or 
figurative contextual cues in the recall of the demonstrated action. We tested dogs with a modified 
version of the Do as I do paradigm by showing them a demonstration of an object-related action and 
then testing their imitative performance after a 1- minute delay, in conditions in which the object used 
during the demonstration was displaced to a different position. This way we separated figurative 
information about the object (On what object to do?) and spatial information about the location of the 
demonstration (Where to do?). Thus, after the ‘do it!’ command, dogs had to choose matching either 
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the location or the object. We used the two-action procedure in order to test if dogs also imitate the 
action that was shown by the demonstrator (What to do?) and to control for other non-imitative 
processes (Akins and Zentall 1996).  
Dogs are known to be particularly perceptive to human ostensive communicative cues and many 
studies showed that they are skilled in relying on various human gestures (see Bensky et al. 2013 for a 
recent review). Consistently, we hypothesised that dogs’ success of matching the object-related cues in 
the ‘Do as I Do task’ (act upon the displaced object rather than going to the location at which the 
demonstration was seen) could be facilitated by using a human ostensive communicative cue to 
enhance the attention of the dog towards the displacement of the matching object and/or towards the 
object itself. 
Our results confirm dogs’ ability of deferred imitation with a delay of 1 minute and reveal that, when 
spatial and figurative information are incongruent at the time when dogs are required to imitate, dogs 
show a strong spatial bias and a difficulty to spontaneously use figurative information to help recall. To 
some extent this bias could be reversed by using ostensive cues making the dogs aware about the 
contextual changes. 
 
3.2 Material and methods 
3.2.1 Subjects 
The subjects in this study consisted of 16 adult pet dogs ranging from 3 to 9 years old and their owners 
who volunteered to participate. The dogs were 12 females and 4 males belonging to various breeds (1 
Golden retriever, 3 border collies, 1 galgo, 1 Jack Russell terrier, 1 Shetland sheepdog, 2 poodles, 3 
Labradors, 1 Chihuahua and 3 mixed breeds).  
Before the study began, all the subjects had already been trained by their owners with a modified 
version of the ‘Do as I do’ method to match their behaviour to actions that were demonstrated before a 
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short interval of approximately 30 seconds elapsed, as described in detail by Fugazza and Miklósi 
(2013). 
3.2.2 Testing 
The tests were carried out in three different dog schools (Happy Dog School in Como, Italy, Good Boy 
in Torino, Italy and Ludocan in Barcellona, Spain). All dogs were tested in areas that were familiar to 
them. 
For each test, 1 or 2 objects (depending on the testing condition) randomly chosen out of 4 (see Table 
3) were placed at a distance of 2.5 m from each other. The choice between the two possible respective 
positions for the objects was semi-randomised with half of the demonstrations being performed at each 
location. An opaque screen was placed behind the objects and was used in those conditions in which 
dogs were prevented from looking at the objects during the retention interval (Figure 4). The testing 
sessions were recorded by two video cameras placed in two different positions in order to always have 
a view of the dog and the owner. 
The object-related actions that the owners were required to demonstrate to their dogs were randomly 
assigned to each dog for each object, choosing from two possible novel (not previously trained) actions 
so that, for each object, dogs were divided in two groups regarding the action they were shown, 
according to the two-action procedure. The actions are described in detail in Table 3. 
In each trial the owner demonstrated a different object-related action, so that all 4 objects were used 
once in each condition. 
In each trial the owner entered the testing area with his dog on leash and asked him to stay in a 
predetermined position at a distance of 3 m from both objects, using cues known by the dog, while s/he 
performed the demonstration of an object-related action. The owner then returned to the starting 
position, picked up the leash that was let loose on the ground during the demonstration, and either 
stayed there still with his/her dog on leash or walked with him/her behind a screen, depending on the 
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testing condition (see detailed description below). After a retention interval of 1 minute elapsed, during 
which the setup was experimentally modified according to the various testing conditions described 
below, the owner returned to the starting position (if he was behind the screen), released the dog and 
gave the ‘Do it!’ command while looking straight ahead at a distant point in the middle of the two 
objects (Figure 4). Dogs were tested with this procedure in 8 conditions, consisting of 4 trials each. The 
subjects were randomly divided in two groups regarding the order of administration of Conditions 2, 3, 
4 and 5 in order to control for possible learning effects. The Visible First group started with Condition 
2 to 5, and The Invisible First group started with Condition 5 to 2. 
Condition 1: Two-object visible no displacement (baseline)  
All dogs were first tested in a baseline condition in which two objects were present at two different 
locations. The owner demonstrated one of two possible object-related actions, then walked with the dog 
behind the screen and stayed there for the whole duration of the retention interval (1 minute). In the 
baseline condition the position of the objects at the moment of the ‘Do it!’ command was the same as it 
was during the demonstration (i.e., they were not displaced after the demonstration).  
Condition 2: Single object visible displacement 
Before the test begun one object was positioned at one of the two locations that were used for the 
objects in the baseline condition. After the owner’s demonstration of an action on the object, this was 
displaced by the experimenter to the position where the other object would have been in the baseline 
condition (that is the object was shifted of 2.5 m from its original position). The displacement took 
place while the owner kept the dog on leash in the starting position, thus dogs had full view of the 
object movement. 
Condition 3: Single object invisible displacement 
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The same as Condition 2 above, but the owner and the dog walked behind the screen after the 
demonstration and remained there for the whole duration of the retention interval (1 minute), thus the 
dog was prevented from seeing the displacement. 
Condition 4: Two objects visible displacement 
Before the test begun two objects were positioned by the owner in the two predetermined locations as 
in the baseline condition. After the owner’s demonstration of an action on one object, the position of 
the two objects was reversed by two experimenters simultaneously. When carrying the objects, the two 
experimenters crossed their path by keeping right and did not talk to or look at the dog ostensively. The 
displacement of the objects took place while the owner kept the dog on leash in the starting position, 
thus the dog had full view of the objects and their movements. After the displacement the 
experimenters turned their back to the dog and went away from the testing area to a position that was in 
line with a virtual point in the middle of the two objects, and looked down to the ground. 
Condition 5: Two objects invisible displacement 
The same as Condition 4 above, but the owner and the dog walked behind the screen after the 
demonstration and remained there for the whole duration of the retention interval, thus the dog was 
prevented from seeing the displacement. 
Condition 6: Ostensive cuing during two objects visible displacement 
The same as Condition 4 above, but the experimenter who displaced the object on which the owner 
demonstrated the action, attracted the dog’s attention towards the displacement (or towards the object) 
by ostensive cues (i.e., called the dog’s name, smacked his/her lips and alternated his/her gaze between 
the dog and the object) during the displacement. A female and a male experimenter alternated in this 
role. If the dog was looking in his/her direction during the displacement, the dog’s name was called 
only once at the beginning of the displacement; if the dog looked in a different direction, the 
experimenter used again the described ostensive cues to direct the attention of the dog back towards the 
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displacement of the object. The experimenter who displaced the object on which no action was 
demonstrated behaved as in Condition 4. After the visible displacement, the two experimenters left the 
objects as they did in the two objects visible displacement condition. 
Condition 7: Pointing after two objects invisible displacement 
The same as Condition 5 above but, while the owner performed the demonstration, an experimenter 
stood in the middle of the 2 objects looking at the ground. After the demonstration the owner and the 
dog went behind the screen for the duration of the retention interval and returned to the starting 
position for the ‘Do it!’, as in Condition 5. Before the ‘Do it!’ command was given, the experimenter 
attracted the dog’s attention and pointed with her arm towards the object on which the demonstration 
was performed (her finger reached approximately a distance of 90 cm form the object) and looked at it. 
The pointing lasted approximately 2 seconds. After the experimenter resumed his original neutral 
position looking at the ground, the owner released the dog and gave the ‘Do it!’ command. 
 
Conditions 6 and 7 were administered to all subjects in the same order. As this may have caused order 
effects, in Condition 8 we repeated the same testing procedure as in Condition 4 for half of the subjects 
(N=8), to compare their performances to those obtained in Condition 4, thus controlling for possible 
order effects. 
 
3.2.3 Data collection and analysis 
We analysed the behaviour of the dogs after the ‘Do it!’ command in order to assess if they matched 
the demonstrated action as well as if they matched the position where the demonstration was performed 
or the object on which it was performed, which in all conditions but the baseline were mutually 
exclusive. Given the specie-specific differences between humans and dogs the action of the dog was 
scored as matching only if he used the corresponding body part for performing a similar body 
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movement (see Table 3 for more details). 
First we compared with Fisher’s exact test the number of matching the action, the position and the 
object in the same conditions between the two groups that participated to the tests in counterbalanced 
order. Then, we compared the number of matching the action, the position and the object in Conditions 
from 2 to 5 to the number obtained in the baseline condition. We also used Fisher’s exact test to 
compare the number of matching the action, the position and the object in the Ostensive cuing during 
two objects visible displacement condition to the same numbers in the Two objects visible 
displacement condition, because those conditions only differed in the social cues provided (or not) by 
the experimenter during the displacement. The same statistical analysis was done to compare the results 
of the Pointing after two objects invisible displacement condition with those of the Two objects 
invisible displacement condition, because they only differed in the presence (or absence) of the 
experimenter performing the pointing gesture. Finally, as the Ostensive cuing during two objects 
visible displacement and Pointing conditions were administered to all subjects in the same order, we 
compared the number of matching the action, the position and the object in the control for order effect 
condition with the two objects visible displacement, to control for possible order effects. 
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Table 3 Objects used for the testing, description of the two actions used as human demonstrations 
(two-action procedure) and description of the expected dog’s behaviour 
 
OBJECT 
Description of the object 
ACTION A  
Description of the owner’s 
demonstration and 
Description of the expected 
dog’s behaviour 
ACTION B 
Description of the owner’s 
demonstration and 
Description of the expected 
dog’s behaviour 
 
Lid: a plastic lid hanging at 
the height of the dog’s 
shoulder from a string 
attached to a horizontal pole  
 
 
The owner swings the lid using 
his hand 
The dog swings the lid using his 
front paw 
 
The owner swings the lid using 
his nose 
The dog swings the lid using 
his nose 
 
Helmet: a motorcycle helmet 
placed on the ground 
The owner walks around the 
helmet 
The dog walks around the 
helmet 
The Owner touches the helmet 
with his hand 
The dogs touches the helmet 
with his front paw 
 
Tube: a cartoon tube placed 
horizontally on the ground 
The owner touches the tube with 
his hand 
The dog touches the tube with 
his front paw 
 
The owner jumps over the tube 
 
The dog jumps over the tube  
 
Box: a plastic box placed 
with the empty end facing the 
ground 
The owner climbs on top of the 
box with his feet  
The dogs climbs on top of the 
box with all four  
The owner puts both hands on 
the box 
The dog puts both front paws 
on the box 
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Figure 4 Experimental setting: 1 or 2 objects (depending on the testing condition) randomly chosen out 
of 4 are placed at a distance of 2.5 m from each other. The owner and the dog are facing the objects. An 
opaque screen is behind them and is used in those conditions in which dogs are prevented from looking 
at the objects during the retention interval. The arrows indicate the displacement of the objects in the 
Single object visible displacement (a), Single object invisible displacement (b), Two objects visible 
displacement (c) and Two objects invisible displacement (d). 
a" b"
c" d"
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3.3 Results and discussion 
In the Baseline condition dogs matched the demonstration in 84.4% of the trials. 
Comparing the number of matching action, position and object between the Visible First group (N=8) 
and Non-visible First group (N=8) we did not find any significant difference in any condition (Fisher’s 
exact test yielded the following values, respectively for matching action, matching position and 
matching object: in the Single object visible condition respectively P=1; P=0.6128 and P=1; in the 
Single object invisible displacement condition P=0.585; P=0.0816; P=0.3649; in the Two objects 
visible displacement condition P=1; P=0.585; P=0.585; in the Two objects invisible displacement 
condition P=0.0787; P=0.4302; P=0.2869). Also the number of matching action, position and object in 
the control for order condition did not differ from the number of matching in the Two objects visible 
displacement (Fisher’s exact test respectively P=0.5124; P=0.8102; P=0.8102) thus we excluded that 
the order of administration of the various conditions had any effect on the compared variables and we 
analysed the data of the two groups together.  
In the Single object visible displacement condition the dogs matched the action in 85.9%, the position 
in 6.2% and the object in 89% of the trials. In the Single object invisible displacement condition they 
matched the action in 70.3%, the position in 15.6% and the object in 78.1% of the trials. In the Two 
objects visible displacement condition they matched the action in 42.2%, the position in 70.3% and the 
object in 29.7% of the trials. In the Two objects invisible displacement condition they matched the 
action in 46.9%, the position in 65.6% and the object in 32.8% of the trials. In the Ostensive cuing 
during two objects visible displacement condition they matched the action in 62.5%, the position in 
43.75% and the object in 54.7% of the trials. In the Pointing after two objects invisible displacement 
condition they matched the action in 68.8%, the position in 37.5% and the object in 62.5% of the trials.  
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First, we compared the number of matching action, position and object in those conditions where only 
one object was present and displaced after the demonstration (Single object visible and Single object 
invisible displacement conditions) to the number of matching in the Baseline (Figure 5). We only found 
a significant difference in the matching of the position (Fisher’s exact test P=0.0001 in both the visible 
and invisible condition) and we did not find significant differences in the matching of object and action 
(Fisher’s exact test values: Single object visible displacement: action matching P=1; object matching 
P=0.6036; Single object invisible displacement: action matching P=0.0901; object matching 
P=0.4975). This indicates that, if only one object is present, even if it is displaced after the 
demonstration, dogs match the action and the object, as they do in the baseline condition, and they do 
not match the position, at which there is no object present at the time of the ‘Do it!’ command. 
However, interestingly, in some trials (4 out of 64 in the Single object visible displacement condition 
and 10 out of 64 in the Single object invisible displacement condition) dogs matched the position where 
the object was during the demonstration (they approached the former location of the object). One dog 
also replicated the demonstrated action without object being at the location where the object was at the 
time of demonstration. 
Second, we compared the number of matching between the conditions in which two objects were 
present and displaced after the demonstration (Two object visible or invisible displacement) to the 
number of matching in the Baseline and we did not find a significant difference in the matching of the 
position in the Two objects visible displacement (Fisher’s exact test P=0.0901) while all the other 
comparisons yielded significant values for both conditions (Fisher’s exact test: action and object 
matching P=0.0001 in both conditions; position matching P=0.0238 in the Two object invisible 
condition) (Figure 5). However, comparing the number of matching positions with the number of 
matching object within condition, in both the Two objects visible and invisible displacement 
conditions, dogs matched more often the position rather than the object (Two objects visible 
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displacement Fisher’s exact test P=0.0001; Two objects invisible displacement Fisher’s exact test 
P=0.0004) and the matching of the position was above chance level as assessed by the Sign test (Two 
objects visible and invisible displacement condition, Sign test one tail P=0.0008 and P=0.0084, 
respectively). 
Third, we compared the number of matching in the Ostensive cuing during two objects visible 
displacement condition to the number of matching in the Two objects visible displacement condition 
(Figure 6). We found that they differed in all three variables: dogs matched more the action and the 
object in the Ostensive cuing during two objects visible displacement condition whereas they matched 
the position in the Two objects visible displacement (Fisher’s exact test respectively P=0.0333; 
P=0.007 and P=0.0041). Similarly the number of matching in the Pointing after two objects invisible 
displacement condition differed significantly from the number of matching in the Two objects invisible 
displacement condition (Fisher’s exact test P=0.0196; P=0.0014 and P=0.0025). This indicates that 
social cues provided in the Ostensive cuing during two objects visible displacement and Pointing 
conditions counterbalanced the dogs’ preferences for choosing the demonstrated location in the Two 
objects visible and invisible conditions. However the number of matching object in the Ostensive cuing 
during two objects visible displacement condition was below chance level (Sign test one tail 
P=0.2662), whilst it was above chance level in the Pointing after two objects invisible displacement 
condition (Sign test one tail P=0.03). 
The number of action matching was above chance in the baseline, Single object visible displacement, 
(Sign test one-tail P<0.0001 in both conditions) and also in the Single object invisible displacement 
condition (Sign test one tail P=0.0016). The number of action matching in the Two objects visible 
displacement and Two objects invisible displacement conditions was below chance level (Sign test 
respectively one-tail P=0.1302 and one-tail P=0.354), whereas in the Ostensive cuing during two 
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4 Study 3: The efficiency of the Do as I do method compared to shaping / clicker training to train 
dogs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a quite big popular literature on the practical application of dog training methods (e.g. Lindsay 
2000); nevertheless this field has not received much attention from scientists. In fact most of the 
training methods have not received a validation by a scientific approach and the scientific knowledge 
on whether one method would be superior to others with regard to a given behavioural situation or goal 
to be achieved is basically non existing (Miklósi 2007). The approaches to dog training have been 
categorized by Mills (2005) according to the two main behavioural models used in behavioural 
sciences: the associative approach, as described by the behaviouristic learning theory (Watson 1913) 
and the cognitive approach, as theorized by the psychologists (Tolman 1948). According to this 
categorization, associative training approaches – which are those on which most dog training rely 
(Mills 2005) - concentrate on exposing the dog to the relation between two events (unconditioned and 
conditioned stimuli) and/or on the association between a discriminative stimulus and an operant 
behaviour. On the other hand, the role of attention and the knowledge of the learner are more 
considered in the cognitive oriented approaches.  
Shaping (SHA) is one of the most widespread and popular techniques to train dogs (e.g. Pryor 1999). In 
Shaping procedures the dog’s spontaneous behaviour is gradually adjusted by means of strategically 
timed reinforcements as typically prescribed by operant conditioning rules (Skinner 1951). Shaping 
involves breaking down the training goal to be reached or target behaviour into simpler parts so that 
otherwise complex behaviours can be trained by carefully arranging these simpler parts of the target 
behaviour according to a plan or program of instrumental contingencies (Lindsay 2000). Practically, a 
sound producing device (“the clicker”) is typically used as (1) a secondary reinforcer (2) a marker 
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(‘clicker training’), which serves to distinguish for the animal a particular behaviour as the event that 
has earned the primary reinforcer and/or (3) as a bridging stimulus which fills the temporal gap 
between the behaviour and the primary reinforcer (usually food), by signalling that the latter is coming 
(Pryor 1999, 2005, Williams 1994). Effective classical conditioning of this bridging stimulus is crucial 
to the shaping process.  According to Lindsay (2000), before the trainer can use shaping as a training 
method, the dog is required to learn that (1) the link of the bridging stimulus with a remote but 
forthcoming reinforcer and (2) the contingency of this with the emission of a particular behaviour. In 
shaping procedures, once the dog has learnt the association between the sound produced by the clicker 
and the primary reinforcement, the clicker is activated by the trainer with a strategic timing so that it 
produces the ‘click’ noise precisely when the spontaneous behaviour of the dog approximates to the 
action to be trained. This way, by rewarding successive approximations, the spontaneous behaviour of 
the dog is gradually shaped to reach the final desired response. Thus the trainer has the main role of 
delivering the secondary reinforcement (‘click’) and primary reinforcement (‘food’) at the right 
moment. With this method the dog gradually learns individually by trial and error what actions are 
rewarded and what are not. 
As mentioned earlier, recent studies have provided robust evidence that dogs are adept to learn socially 
both from con- and heterospecifics (Kubinyi et al. 2009 for review) and following a specific training, 
dogs are also able to match their behaviour to actions shown by a human experimenter (Topál et al. 
2006, Huber at al. 2009). However, little use of this mechanism has been made in formal dog training. 
It is also surprising that only very few studies (Slabbert and Rasa 1997; McKinley and Young 2003) 
focused on the use of social learning in the applied field of dog training. McKinley and Young (2003) 
utilised the ‘model-rival’ technique (Todt 1975; Pepperberg, 1999) to train dogs for a retrieval selection 
task. The model-rival method has been extensively used in experiments investigating the cognitive 
abilities of parrots (e.g., Pepperberg 1994). With this method social stimuli are used to create in the 
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subject an interest in an object without the use of food. According to Cracknell et al. (2008) this 
method relies on social processes (stimulus enhancement) to direct the animals’ attention to the specific 
object to be retrieved. McKinley and Young (2005) found that dogs trained with this method can 
perform as well as dogs trained with traditional associative training techniques to retrieve a named 
object. The other study on the use of social learning in dog training (Slabbert & Rasa 1997) 
concentrates on the training for detection of narcotics. The authors found that pups that were exposed 
to the training of their mother between the age of six and 12 weeks outperformed the non-exposed pups, 
when tested at the age of six months on the same task.  
The use of the Do as I do method (DAID) in dog training, however, was not investigated in previous 
studies. The aim of Study 3 was to compare the efficiency of the DAID with that of the SHA method to 
train experienced dogs on novel object-related actions. Some authors (e.g. Thorpe 1963) claim that, for 
imitation to occur, non-typical actions should be involved. Thus we chose to use object-related actions 
for our tests (e.g. ‘open a drawer’, ‘close a door’ or ‘pick up an item and put it in a basket’) because 
those are complex behaviours that are not in the typical spontaneous behaviour repertoire of a pet dog. 
Nevertheless, these kinds of actions are usually required in training dogs that assist disabled owners, 
therefore it is useful to assess with what method they can be more efficiently trained.  Furthermore this 
kind of actions can be systematically varied in terms of complexity. Another reason why we chose to 
use object-related actions in our tests is that some authors (Huber at al. 2009) claim that dogs – as well 
as other animals - have difficulty of replicating body-oriented actions compared with object-related 
ones. 
In the theoretical framework of cultural evolution it is predicted that individuals tend to rely on social 
learning with increased difficulty of the task (Laland and Brown 2011), as experimentally confirmed 
with regard to humans by McElreath et al. (2005). Consistently, we expected that, in particular, 
difficult actions would be more easily learned by dogs socially than individually and that, especially 
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when difficult tasks are involved, dog training could benefit from the use of social learning with the 
DAID. Thus we compared the efficiency of the DAID with the efficiency of SHA when teaching dogs 
actions of different degrees of difficulty: simple actions, complex actions and action sequences and we 
hypothesised that complex actions would be more efficiently trained with the DAID method, compared 
to SHA, whereas such difference would be less evident when the subjects are tested on simple actions.  
Several factors may influence the success of different training paradigms that may go beyond the aim 
of this study. Thus we do not aim for claiming an absolute superiority of one training method over the 
other, but aim to provide useful insights on the use of social learning in addition to the traditional 
training methods that rely on individual learning, when dogs are trained to learn object-related tasks. 
 
4.2 Material and methods 
4.2.1 Subjects 
A total of 30 dog-owner dyads were recruited for this study. All the owners had experience with 
training and had passed a dog-training exam with their dog, either for shaping / clicker training (SHA 
Group N=15) or for Do as I do (DAID Group N=15) as described in detail in section 2.2. As all 
subjects passed an advanced level training exam, it is possible to consider all the dyads as experienced 
in training. Owners were informed about the aim of the study. 
Dogs belonged to various breeds and the two groups were balanced for breed-groups and age as much 
as possible: in the SHA Group there were a Irish terrier, four Hungarian vizslas, a golden retriever, five 
border collies, a flat coated retriever, a border terrier, a Labrador and a terrier cross breed. In the DAID 
Group there were: a Yorkshire terrier, a Cavalier King Charles spaniel, six border collies, a beagle, a 
poodle, a Shetland shepherd, two mixed breeds, a Czechoslovakian wolf-dog and a Jack Russell terrier. 
The age of the dogs in the SHA Group ranged from 2 to 11 years (mean age 5.9 years; SD±2.82) and in 
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the DAID Group it ranged from 2 to 11 years (mean age 5.6 years; SD±2.98). All dogs practiced some 
sports and training activities with their owners.  
 
4.2.2 Training exams 
The exam for shaping / clicker training is the so-called CAP and is divided into four levels (Kay 
Lawrence http://www.learningaboutdogs.com/html/cap_assessment_.html). Only dog-owners dyads 
that passed at least level 2 or 3 were recruited for this study because we thought these advanced levels 
are comparable with the Do as I do exam (see below). CAP level 2 is assessing the trainer's ability to 
secure a solid foundation in achieving a consistent quality and reliability to cue and develop more 
complex behaviours in free shaping. In the CAP level 3, the assessor looks for different collections of 
compound behaviours, advanced shaping and evidence of data collection and analysis 
(http://www.learningaboutdogs.com/html/cap_criteria.html). 
One of us (C.F.) has recently developed an exam in order to assess the level of training in dogs that are 
trained to copy human actions on command (see Topál et al. 2006 for details of the method). To pass 
the exam for Do as I do, the owner is required to demonstrate that her/his dog can display at least six 
familiar actions (i.e. actions already trained with other techniques) on the ‘Do it!’ command with a 
novel demonstrator. The preliminary training protocol necessary to pass the exam requires that dogs 
learn through operant conditioning techniques to match their behaviour to three demonstrated familiar 
actions on command ‘Do it!’ and then generalize this command to other three familiar actions, before 
the ‘Do it!’ command can be used as a training rule, following the demonstration of novel tasks to be 
learned (see Topál et al. 2006 and Fugazza and Miklósi 2013 for details on the training protocol). The 
definition of behavioural correspondence is based on Topál et al. 2006: the first action that the dog 
performs after the ‘Do it!’ command is considered as functionally matching the demonstration if it 
entails the same goal and, given the species-specific differences in the behaviour repertoire of the two 
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species, is executed in a similar way.  
 
4.2.3 Testing  
Each dog-owner dyad was tested in three subsequent tests in which the owner was instructed to teach 
his dog three new object-related actions (one per test) using only the training method s/he was certified 
for (i.e. clicker training / shaping in the SHA Group and Do as I do in the DAID Group).  
An inter-test interval of at least 30 minutes occurred between two subsequent tests for each subject. 
The maximum inter-test interval was 1 day. 
The timeline for a test was 15 minutes. If the owner did not reach the predetermined goal within this 
time (i.e. the dog did not perform the predetermined action), the test ended and the result was 
considered as a failure (i.e., the owner did not manage to teach the particular action within 15 minutes). 
During the tests, owners in the SHA Group sat on a chair, 1 m from the target object and used food as a 
reward for their dogs. The spontaneous behaviour of the dog was shaped by the means of strategically 
timed reinforcements with a clicker as a marker, followed by a treat, until the first occurrence of the 
predetermined action by the dog. Owners were instructed not to lure the dog’s behaviour. After the 
‘click’, the dog could take the treat from the owner’s hand or the owner could toss it to a strategic 
location that could increase the probability that the subject interacted again with the target object (e.g. 
the owner could toss the treat over the target object, so that the dog, after having eaten the food, had the 
object between himself and the owner). 
In the DAID Group owners were not allowed to give food to their dogs during the tests but could give 
it after the test was finished, in order to keep the dog motivated in the next testing session. During the 
tests owners asked their dogs to stay and pay attention, then they demonstrated the action they wanted 
the dog to perform and gave the ‘Do it!’ command. If the dog did not perform the correct action after 
the first demonstration, owners demonstrated the behaviour again and gave the ‘Do it!’ command 
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again, until they reached the predetermined result. If the action provoked a modification in the object 
(e.g., the drawer was opened), the experimenter repositioned the object in the original situation (e.g., 
closed the drawer) after the owner’s demonstration but before the ‘Do it!’ command. 
In both groups the owners could decide to take as many breaks as they thought were necessary for a 
successful training. When taking a break, owners in the SHA Group went away from the testing area 
with their dogs and did not give them treats for the whole duration of the break. Owners in the DAID 
Group stopped and behaved with them as they usually did at the end of a training session. The break 
could last form 5 minutes to 4 hours, according to the owner’s decision and availability for the tests. 
Owners were informed that, for the analysis of results on learning latencies, the time of the breaks was 
not considered as part of the test. 
For both groups all tests were run in the presence of an experienced dog trainer who could give 
suggestions to the owners regarding the training strategy. They were two experts respectively in 
shaping / clicker training or Do as I do and also assessors for the training exams and gave suggestions 
only to the owners of the group using the method they were expert on. The suggestions that were given 
regarded the training strategy (e.g., where to toss the food in the SHA Group, how to demonstrate the 
action in the DAID group and when to take a break in both groups).  
 
Actions for the testing  
The actions were selected randomly from a predetermined list of 12 actions (see Table 4 for details), 
discarding only those that were eventually already familiar for a particular dog (Before the testing, each 
owner had filled a complete list of the actions already taught to his dog, so that those actions were not 
used in the tests). 
All the actions chosen for this study were object-related actions - which are particularly useful, for 
example, for assistance dogs helping humans with disability. They differed in difficulty: simple actions, 
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complex actions and action sequences. The simple actions involved getting in contact or interaction 
(e.g., touch) with specific objects (e.g., knock over a bottle, ring a bell); the complex actions 
necessitated more elaborate manipulation of objects and consisted of tasks which are usually required 
for an assistance dog (e.g., open a drawer, close a locker etc.) and deviate from the natural behavioural 
tendencies of dogs; action sequences consisted of two actions (e.g., climb on a chair and ring a bell). 
The required actions, as well as the number of subjects tested on each single action, are described in 
detail in Table 4.  
Each dog-owner dyad was tested only with one action in all conditions representing different levels of 
difficulty, thus each owner was required to train his dog on a simple action, on a complex one and on a 
sequence during three different testing sessions. In order to control for the eventual difference in the 
difficulty of the tasks within a category, each subject in the SHA Group was matched with a subject in 
the DAID Group with regard to the three actions they were required to train during the tests.  
Two subjects (one from the SHA Group and one from the DAID Group) were tested on two simple 
actions and one sequence (another simple action instead of the complex one) because all the complex 
actions of our list were already familiar for them. 
The order of the tests (simple action, complex action and action sequence) was randomized for each 
matched pair of dogs learning the same actions, with the order being the same for the subjects of the 
same pair. 
The testing sessions were recorded by two video cameras placed in two different positions in order to 
always have a view of the dog and the owner. 
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Action 
(Subjects 
tested per 
group) 
Description of the action  N. of failures 
within 15 
min. in the 
SHA Group 
N. of failures 
within 15 min. 
in the DAID 
Group 
SIMPLE ACTIONS 
Ring a 
doorbell 
(N=4) 
A doorbell with a button on top is placed on 
the ground. If the button is pushed the 
doorbell rings. The dog is required to ring the 
doorbell so that a sound is emitted 
0  0 
Ring bell 
(N=2) 
A metallic bell hangs from a hurdle at ca. the 
same height as the dog’s withers. The dog is 
required to ring the bell by touching it with 
any part of his body. A sound has to be 
emitted from the bell when the dog touches it 
0  0 
Paws in 
hoop (N=4) 
A plastic hoop is placed on the ground. The 
dog is required to enter the hoop with all fours 
0  0 
Knock over 
bottle 
(N=6) 
A plastic bottle is placed vertically on the 
ground. The dog is required to knock it over 
0  0 
COMPLEX ACTIONS 
Open 
drawer 
(N=1) 
A string is attached to the handle of the 
drawer of a small cabinet with a drawer and a 
locker. The dog is required to open the drawer 
for at least 10 cm 
0  0 
Close 
drawer 
(N=4) 
The drawer of a small cabinet with a drawer 
and a locker is opened (15 cm). The dog is 
required to close the drawer 
1  0 
Open 
locker 
(N=2) 
A string is attached to the handle of the locker 
of a small cabinet with a drawer and a locker. 
The dog is required to open the locker for at 
least 10 cm 
2  0 
Close 
locker 
(N=7) 
The locker of a small cabinet with a drawer 
and a locker is opened (30 cm). The dog is 
required to close the locker 
0  0 
SEQUENCES 
Object in 
basket 
(N=5) 
A basket (ca. 40 x 30 x 8 cm) is placed on the 
ground. A small purse is placed 50 cm from 
the basket. The dog is required to pick up the 
purse and put it in the basket 
2  1 
On chair 
ring bell 
(N=1) 
A metallic bell is hanging in a high position 
over a chair. The dog can reach the bell only 
if it climbs on the chair. The dog is required 
to climb on the chair and ring the bell. A 
sound has to be emitted from the bell when 
the dog touches it 
1  0 
On chair 
ring 
A doorbell is placed on a cabinet. The dog 
can reach the doorbell only if it climbs on the 
2  1 
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doorbell 
(N=6) 
chair that is adjacent to the cabinet. The dog 
is required to climb on the chair and ring the 
doorbell. A sound has to be emitted from the 
doorbell when the dog touches it 
Open 
locker pick 
up object 
(N=3) 
A small purse is placed in the locker. The dog 
is required to open the locker and take the 
purse out of it 
3  0 
 
Table 4. List and description of the actions the subjects were required to accomplish during the tests, 
number of subjects tested on each single action per group and number of dyads that failed to complete 
the task within 15 minutes 
 
4.2.4 Data collection and analysis 
From the videos obtained we determined:  
1. The number of dyads who completed the predetermined task within 15 minutes in the two groups; 
2. The time from the beginning of the training session to the first correct occurrence of the selected 
action (latency). In the case of SHA Group the beginning of the session was either marked by the first 
‘click’ or by the owner tossing a treat on the floor as these were the routines typically used by the 
owners to start the training. In the case of DAID Group, the training session started when the owner 
made the dog stay and pay attention to the demonstration;  
3. We also calculated the number of owners that took breaks for their dogs in each group and the 
number of breaks.  
The difference between SHA and DAID groups in the test outcome (i.e., the number of dogs that 
succeeded or failed within 15 minutes in the two groups) was statistically analysed by using Fisher’s 
exact test. 
In a conservative statistical analysis of the learning latencies we considered the data only from those 
dogs that actually completed the task within 15 minutes. Normality of the data on the latencies of those 
 67 
dyads that completed the task before the timeline was checked with the Anderson-Darling Normality 
test and latency values were compared between DAID and SHA dogs by unpaired t-tests if they 
followed the normal distribution, and by Mann-Whitney U test if they did not follow the normal 
distribution. 
In order to assess if the efficiency of the two training methods increases with increased complexity of 
the tasks, we compared the relative difference of the learning latencies when training complex and 
simple actions with the two methods by unpaired t-test.  
The number of owners who took breaks for their dogs during the tests was compared between the two 
groups in each condition by Fisher’s exact test P=0.018 and the number of breaks in each condition 
was compared between the two groups by Mann-Whitney U test. 
We used GraphPad software for the statistical analysis of the results. 
 
4.3 Results and discussion 
Simple actions 
When tested on simple actions all dogs in both groups where able to perform the predetermined action 
within 15 minutes (Table 2). We did not find a significant difference in learning latency between the 
two groups (t=1.47; df=29; P=0.152) (Figure 7). When training the simple actions no trainer decided to 
take a break for his/her dog during the tests. 
Complex actions 
All 14 dogs tested in the DAID Group succeeded with the complex actions and in the SHA Group 11 
dogs out of 14 succeeded within 15 minutes. Accordingly, both training methods seemed to be equally 
successful (Fisher’s exact test P=0.22).  
However, subjects in the DAID Group outperformed those in the SHA Group by obtaining 
significantly shorter latencies to display the target complex action (t test: t=3.62; df=22; P=0.0015).  
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Significantly more owners (9 out of 14) in the SHA Group had breaks for their dogs during the training 
of complex actions than owner in the DAID Group (2 out of 14) (Fisher’s exact test P=0.018) and the 
number of breaks in the DAID Group was significantly smaller than the number of breaks in the SHA 
Group (Mann-Whitney U test: U=44; df=27; P=0.013) 
Action sequences 
In this test, 13 dogs out of 15 in the DAID group and only 7 dogs out of 15 in the SHA group 
succeeded within 15 minutes. Thus the training method affected the success of dogs, that is, 
significantly more dogs were successful in the DAID group (Fisher’s exact test P=0.05). 
In the conservative statistical analysis on learning latencies (see above) we did not find a significant 
difference between the two groups (Mann-Whitney U test: U=24; df=19; P=0.09). 
Upon training action sequences significantly more owners (13 out of 15) in the SHA Group took breaks 
for their dogs during the tests than owners in the DAID Group (5 out of 15) (Fisher’s exact test 
P=0.0078) and the number of breaks in the DAID Group was significantly smaller than the number of 
breaks in the SHA Group (Mann-Whitney U test: U=49.5; df=29; P=0.009). 
In the tests on action sequences all owners in the SHA Group used the so-called ‘back-chaining’ 
strategy, that is they trained the last action of the sequence first and then the first action, before training 
the dog to perform the whole sequence in the proper order. Owners in the DAID Group trained the 
sequence in the given order since the first trial, demonstrating the first action followed by the second 
one since the very first demonstration of the training session. 
Relative difference in learning latencies 
The relative difference of the learning latencies when training complex and simple actions with the 
SHA method is significantly larger compared to the difference of the learning latencies when training 
complex and simple actions with the DAID method (t test: t=3.43; df=21; P=0.0025). Thus dogs in the 
DAID group show a smaller increase in the latency if they have to perform a complex action. 
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While we did not find a significant difference between the two training methods with regard to simple 
actions, we found that subjects using the Do as I do method outperformed those using shaping/clicker 
training in the case of complex actions and sequences of two actions. This study is the first to formalize 
a method based on the Do as I do protocol for training dogs and to assess its efficiency by comparing it 
with shaping/clicker training. Consistently with the social learning strategy theory, the DAID method, 
which is based on social learning, is particularly useful for teaching difficult object-related actions. 
From a cognitive perspective, the efficiency of the DAID method relies on dogs’ ability to flexibly use 
various sources of social information such as local enhancement, goal emulation and functional 
imitation.  
 
SIMPLE TASKS 
 DO AS I DO (N=15)  SHAPING (N=15) 
Subjects that succeeded within 15 min  15  15 
Mean latency   27.18  45.25 
SD  26.72  49.11 
COMPLEX TASKS 
 DO AS I DO (N=14)  SHAPING  (N=14) 
Subjects that succeeded within 15 min  14  11 
Mean latency   55.71  356.18 
SD  59.23  322.66 
SEQUENCES 
 DO AS I DO (N=15)  SHAPING (N=15) 
Subjects that succeeded within 15 min  13  7 
Mean latency   192.07  318.14 
SD  243.45  234.29 
 
Table 5. Number of subjects that succeeded to accomplish the task within 15 minutes in the various 
conditions, mean latency and SD to the first occurrence of the predetermined action  
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Figure 7 Mean latency (+ SD) of the first occurrence of the predetermined action in the Do as I do 
group (DAID) and in the Shaping group (SHA) (** indicate statistically significant difference; 
unpaired t test, P=0.05) 
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5 General discussion 
The study of imitation is particularly interesting from the cognitive perspective because it gives the 
possibility to investigate how dogs represent the actions of others, their memory of events and what 
social cognitive abilities they use when they interact and learn socially from humans. This adds 
important information to our understanding of dog behaviour and cognition.  
 
5.1 Deferred imitation in domestic dogs 
In study 1 dogs showed robust imitative performance that convincingly supports deferred imitation. 
They typically reproduced familiar and novel actions after different delays, also in a different context 
and also after their owners distracted them with different kinds of activities before asking them to recall 
and imitate the action that was demonstrated. In the tests where familiar object-related actions were 
shown it cannot be ruled out that dogs relied on (deferred) stimulus enhancement (Galef 1988) to match 
the object that was manipulated by the demonstrator and that they matched also the action just because 
this was the most probable action for a dog on that object. However, the results of the Two-action tests 
reveal that dogs were able to imitate after a delay because they not only acted on the same object that 
was manipulated by the demonstrator, but also copied the different novel actions that were performed 
on that object. In the test in which the two different actions led to different outcomes dogs may have 
used goal emulation, but they were also able to match their body movement to the demonstration in the 
test in which the two different actions led to the same outcome. This result can be explained only by 
their ability of deferred imitation. 
We also added a condition in which the ‘Do it!’ command was given by an unknowledgeable (‘naïve’) 
experimenter after a delay of 1.15 minutes to control for Clever Hans effect. This effect may arise 
when the owner is aware of the goal of the experiment, as in the case of Study 1, and he/she may 
involuntary display cues to the dog that increase its performance (Pfungst 1911). Although Hegedűs et 
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al. (2013) did not find a Clever Hans effect in a two-way object choice test on dogs, other authors 
(Horowitz et al 2013, Prato Previde et al. 2008) emphasised that ostensive communication has a 
significant influence on dogs’ performances in different behavioural situations and Clever Hans effect 
can occur in different tasks (Lit et al. 2011, Szetei et al. 2003). In our control condition for such effect 
all dogs were able to reproduce the demonstrated action, which allowed us to exclude any effect of 
involuntary cues given by the demonstrator or the owner on the dog’s performance. It is thus probable 
that dogs trained with the Do as I do method learn to rely only on the demonstration of the action and 
do not rely on other cues to solve the task. 
In the condition in which the owner did not demonstrate any action before the ‘Do it!’ command (No 
demonstration control condition), dogs did not perform any action on the objects used for the tests and 
tended to stay still. This result is consistent with the finding from Topál et al. (2006) and also excludes 
that the mere presence of the objects and the human could elicit the target behaviours (social 
facilitation).  
All dogs except one imitated the demonstration in the Novel action condition. Nevertheless, also the 
dog that was scored as ‘no match’ entered the box, but she did so only using her front paws, leaving the 
hind legs outside. Thus she approximated her behaviour to the demonstration showing that she was able 
to at least partially encode and recall the demonstration. As argued by Whiten and Custance (1996) 
novelty is a relative concept that can refer to various aspects of the behaviour (e.g., the object involved, 
the body movement, the context etc.). We considered the behaviour new if it had never been trained to 
that particular dog (Heyes and Sagerson 2002). In the Novel action condition the behaviour was new 
regarding both the body movement and the object for all dogs, with the exception of one subject. This 
dog was previously trained by the owner to enter a box, although this box was different from that used 
during testing in many respects (different in shape, size, material and colour). Thus for this dog, that 
action was new only with regard to the target object. 
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We could exclude that only one action was possible for a dog on the object used for the novel actions 
because we showed overall three different actions on the box in the Novel action condition and in the 
Two-action test: ‘Enter the box’, ‘Look in the box’ and ‘Touch the box with paw’. The ability of the 
dogs to match their behaviour to the various actions that were shown demonstrates that at least three 
different actions were conceivable for a dog on that object: thus we can exclude that ‘Enter the box’ 
was the only achievable or probable action for a dog who could just match the object after a delay 
(delayed matching), or that the increased attention towards the stimulus alone can explain the observed 
behavioural similarity (stimulus enhancement).  
In the condition in which the owners demonstrated two different actions leading to two different 
outcomes (i.e. ‘Knock over a tube’ and ‘Walk around the tube’) the dogs may have solved the task 
using goal emulation instead of imitation, because they not only reached the same goal (i.e. caused the 
same movement of the object, making it fall or not) but also used the same body action. In particular, in 
the case of the ‘Knock over the tube’ demonstration, the affordance of the object – the tube passed 
from a vertical to a horizontal position - might have helped to retrieve the goal to be reached. However, 
in the Two-action test on the box (or Multi-action test, if also the ‘Enter the box’ action is considered) 
dogs were not provided with information on the objects’ affordance and goal, because no modification 
in the object was possible. In this condition dogs were still able to match the three actions that were 
demonstrated on the object, thus showing strong imitative abilities that perfectly fit the definition of 
deferred imitation. 
While the two-action procedure usually involves two different groups of subjects that are tested on two 
different actions (e.g., Akins et al. 1996; Dorrance and Zentall 2001; Van de Waal et al. 2012), in Study 
1 all dogs were exposed to the demonstration of ‘Enter the box’ in the Novel action condition and later, 
in the Two-action condition two other different actions on the same box were demonstrated (‘Touch the 
box’ was demonstrated to five subjects and ‘Look in the box’ to the other three). Thus the same 
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subjects were exposed to two different actions on the same objects and were able to match their 
behaviour to the actions shown. The present results reveal that dogs are able to change their behaviour 
according to what they have observed in two different tests where two different actions with same 
outcomes are demonstrated to the same subject on the same object.  
When we tested dogs giving the ‘Do it!’ command in a different location from that of demonstration 
after a retention interval of 1 minute, their performance was not affected by context change, which 
further supports the deferred nature of dogs’ imitative abilities and is also consistent with findings on 
human infants (Barnat et al. 1996; Klein and Meltzoff 1999). More importantly, this result provides 
compelling evidence that local enhancement (i.e., increased attention toward the location of the 
demonstration) cannot exhaustively explain the observed behavioural similarity.  
 
5.2 Spatial memory, figurative memory and memory of human actions 
The results we obtained in the baseline condition of Study 2, in which dogs were required to reproduce 
one of two possible object-related actions after a retention interval of 1 minute, confirm dog’s ability of 
deferred imitation as assessed in Study 1 (Fugazza and Miklósi 2013). In our experimental conditions 
in which the object/s were displaced after the demonstration, dogs were able to match their behaviour 
to the demonstration when only one object was present, even if it was displaced to a different location 
after the demonstration. Thus, in the case of functional imitation, dogs are able to generalize across 
contexts to a certain extent. Nonetheless, when two different objects were present during the 
demonstration phase and their respective position was interchanged thereafter, dogs tended to match 
mainly the location of demonstration rather than the object and also their action matching performance 
dropped dramatically. Very likely in those conditions where only one object was present, the fact that 
the location of demonstration was empty at the time of recall facilitated dogs to approach the object in 
the new location. As a consequence, the object itself may have functioned as a retrieval cue that 
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enhanced dogs’ memory of the demonstrated action (Learmonth et al. 2004; Barnat et al. 1996; 
Bjorklund et al. 2002).  
The performance of our dogs in both Two object visible and invisible displacement conditions is 
consistent with other reports on dogs’ strong spatial bias (e.g., Plourde and Fiset 2013) and difficulty to 
rely on figurative cues (e.g., Dumas 1998). Our subjects’ predisposition to match the location rather 
than the object was so strong that in some trials of the conditions in which only one object was present 
and displaced after the demonstration, some dogs went to the location where the demonstration was 
preformed, even if, at the time of recall, this location was empty. In one occasion a dog even performed 
an action that matched the demonstration in the empty location (i.e., without the target object), which 
suggests that, at least for some individuals, imitative abilities in terms of body movements can be quite 
precise and also ‘blind’, considering that the action was performed by the dog as a ‘vacuum action’ that 
did not make sense without the target object.  
Our dogs’ imitative performances differed significantly from the baseline and also dropped below 
chance level (as assessed by the Sign test) in those conditions in which the position of the two objects 
was interchanged and they tended to match the location rather than the object, as opposite to the 
conditions in which they tended to match the object. These results confirm that dogs indeed encode 
some information on the features of the object (e.g., Callahan et al. 2000), which they use as a 
figurative cue to enhance recall of the action that was performed on it by the demonstrator according to 
the two-action procedure and it is possible that, the fact of finding in the matching location a different 
object hindered dogs’ recall of the demonstrated action.  
Miller et al. (2009b) found that dogs search accurately in an invisible displacement task when their 
search immediately follows the displacement and Fiset et al. (2003) discovered that they could solve a 
visible displacement task after delays up to 4 minutes. However, Miller et al. (2009c) report that dogs’ 
performances were not accurate when a barrier prevented their view of the objects during the delay. 
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Such disruptive effects in our experimental protocol, in which two experimenters moved the objects 
simultaneously, may have also affected dog’s imitative performance. However, our dogs’ performance 
in the visible and the invisible displacement conditions differed similarly from the baseline condition in 
which they went behind a curtain after the demonstration. Thus in a Do as I do task, dogs can match the 
demonstration after one minute even if their view of the objects is obscured (see Study 1 and the 
baseline condition of Study 2) and also after much longer delays, up to 24 hours (Fugazza and Miklósi 
in preparation). However, in contrast to their performance in visible displacement tasks (Fiset 2003), in 
a Do as I do task dogs are not able to match the demonstration after a short delay if two objects are 
displaced, irrespectively of whether they observe the displacement or not. It is possible that a deferred 
imitation task is more cognitively demanding for dogs than an object search task, thus their 
performance is more hindered by changes in context and objects, similarly to what was found for 
human 14 month-old infants (e.g. Barnat et al. 1996; Learmonth et al. 2004). 
We also did not find any effect of the order of administration of the various conditions. This indicates 
that the subjects that were allowed to observe first the displacement and later were tested in invisible 
conditions were also not able to overcome their spatial bias by relying on the previously obtained 
information about the position switching of the two objects. 
Dogs are particularly susceptible to the human presence and human communicative cues. The impact 
of human communicative cues on dogs’ behaviour is so strong that they can be mislead to perform non-
functional actions, if these are indicated by the human partner (Topál et al. 2009), even if they 
previously received information about the correct solution (Szetei et al. 2003; Erdőhegyi 2007; Prato-
Previde et al. 2008). Kupán et al. (2011) found that dogs’ preference for a baited container can be 
outweighed by human’s ostensive-communicative signals indicating a different empty container. Dogs’ 
preference for searching at the location where they saw the target object disappear, can be also 
modified by human communicative cues (Plourde and Fiset 2013). Also dogs’ tendency to commit the 
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A-not-B error is reduced if the B location is ostensively enhanced by a human (Kis et al. 2012). 
Consistently, our results also confirm that dogs’ tendencies can be outweighed by human ostensive 
communication directing the dog’s attention to the act of the displacement or to the object itself. Indeed, 
in the conditions (5 and 6) in which a human produced ostensive cues, dogs displayed a higher 
tendency for matching, compared to the respective non-social conditions (Two objects visible and  
invisible displacements). 
As human infants’ imitative performance improve if they are tested on the same object used in the 
demonstration phase, compared to a different one (e.g., Barnat et al. 1996), we also hypothesised that, 
if dogs could follow the human indications to the matching object, the object itself would serve as a 
retrieval cue to help recalling the demonstrated action and, consequently, we expected enhanced 
imitative performances in this condition. However, while the number of object matching was above 
chance level as assessed by the Sign test in the Pointing after two objects invisible displacement 
condition, it was below chance level in the Ostensive cueing during two objects visible displacement 
condition. These results confirm that dogs have a strong tendency to follow the pointing gesture (e.g., 
Reid 2009; Soproni et al. 2002), but they raise the question of why dogs did not rely on the ostensive 
cues. Analysing in more detail the cues provided by the experimenter - given that, if the dog was 
looking in the direction of the matching object during the displacement, the dog’s name was called only 
once at the beginning of the displacement - it is possible that the fact that the experimenter attracted the 
dogs’ attention more at the beginning of the displacement procedure, enhanced also the dogs’ attention 
towards the initial location of the object instead of towards the displacement or the object itself, which 
would be similar to what happens in the case of the A-not-B error (e.g. Topál et al. 2008), thus 
reinforcing (instead of outweighing) the spatial bias. Alternatively it is also possible that some dogs 
focused their attention on the human more than on the object he was carrying (Mongillo et al. 2010). 
Thus the fact that the humans went away from the objects after the displacement hindered their recall 
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of the object or of the displacement by distracting dogs from their task. However, the ostensive cues 
provided by the experimenter before the owner gave the Do it! command were enough to overcome the 
spatial bias and to raise the imitative performance (i.e., action matching) of dogs above chance level 
assessed by the Sign test, which may suggest that dogs’ imitative abilities are enhanced by the 
ostensive cues provided, guiding them towards the correct object. 
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5.3 The efficiency of the Do as I do method compared to shaping / clicker training to train dogs 
In this study we have demonstrated the efficiency of the Do as I do (DAID) method in dog training. In 
particular, actions that are usually required from an assistance dog, such as sequences and complex 
object-related actions are more efficiently trained with the DAID method compared to the SHA 
method. With regard to the simple object-related actions, we did not find any significant difference 
between the two methods, neither concerning the number of dogs that succeeded within 15 minutes, 
nor with regard to the time needed by the trainer to obtain the first correct occurrence of the behaviour. 
Nevertheless, coherently with our expectation, the Do as I do method proved more efficient than the 
shaping method for teaching complex actions and sequences, respectively considering the learning 
latency and the number of dogs succeeding within 15 minutes. In fact, when the dog-owner dyads were 
tested on complex behaviours, the time needed to obtain the first correct performance was dramatically 
shorter in the Do as I do Group compared to the Shaping Group. As we hypothesised, the relative 
difference in the learning latencies between the two methods increased with increased complexity of 
the actions to be taught, which is consistent with the social learning strategy theory (Laland & Brown 
2011). With the action sequences, we found a significant difference with regard to the number of dyads 
that succeeded within 15 minutes (more dyads succeeded in the DAID Group compared to the SHA 
Group) although we did not find a significant difference when we compared the time needed by the 
owners to obtain the first correct performance of the behaviour. We analysed the latency of the first 
performance of the predetermined action in a conservative way that only uses for comparison the 
latencies of those subjects that succeeded within 15 minutes because after this arbitrary deadline we 
stopped the tests. For the sequences, in the SHA Group only 7 dogs succeeded before the cut off time 
in comparison with 13 dogs from the DAID Group. Thus the low sample size may be the cause of the 
absence of significant difference in latencies. We also found a significant difference in the number of 
breaks taken by owners in the two groups: in the SHA Group owners decided to take more breaks 
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compared to the owners in the DAID Group. This could be due to the increased length of the training 
sessions. Furthermore experienced owners using a training method with which the complex actions are 
usually obtained in longer times may have expected long testing sessions since the beginning and 
therefore would have been more likely to take breaks, splitting the expectedly long training session in 
shorter bouts in order to prevent the dog from being tired or stressed later in the training session. Thus 
the expectations that the owners form about the duration of the training session may have influenced 
their decision to take more breaks.  
Dog training is often aimed at teaching dogs a sequence of arbitrary behaviours, which is structured so 
that they occur in a specific order (Lindsay 2000). This order of occurrence is based on a predetermined 
continuity in which one action must always precede the next in a set sequence. The training strategy for 
training sequences in our experiment differed between the two groups: in the SHA Group all owners 
used an operant technique described by Lindsay (2000) as ‘connecting the final response with the 
terminal reinforcer and then adding on successive behaviours up to the origin of the chain’ (so-called 
backward chaining). Differently, owners in the DAID Group demonstrated the predetermined sequence 
beginning with the first action and demonstrating the second action next, so that the whole sequence 
was shown to the dogs in the correct order since the first trial and we did not find a recency effect. 
Apparently this is in contrast with the recency effect found by Huber et al. (2009) as they tested a dog 
trained with the Do as I do protocol on her ability to reproduce sequences. A possible explanation for 
this discrepancy is the different kind of tasks used for the tests: in our sequences the first action of the 
sequence was always necessary to reach the final goal and/or to enable the second action to be 
performed (e.g., open a locker and pick up an object that is placed inside of it or pick up an object from 
the floor and put it in a basket), while the sequences used by Huber et al. (2009) were constituted by 
arbitrary actions that could be also performed in a different order. Thus in our experiment, as opposed 
to Huber et al. (2009), dogs could not perform the last action without having previously performed the 
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first one. The goal of these kind of sequences is an information that would probably require a lot of 
time to be acquired individually by trial and error, as it is the case with shaping. Whereas it is possible 
that the owner’s demonstration of the goal to be reached, together with the demonstration of the correct 
sequence of actions that were required to reach it, helped the dogs in the DAID Group to acquire the 
proper sequence either by goal emulation, (Wood 1989; Tomasello 1990) or by functional imitation, 
where also some aspects of the action are socially acquired (Topál et al. 2006) or also by imitation of 
the sequential organization (Whiten 1998).  
Some preliminary training is necessary for the successful use of the shaping / clicker training method 
both in order to establish the association between the ‘click’ and the primary reinforcement (Murphree 
1974; Lindsay 2000) and also for the dog to become skilled with this form of trial and error learning so 
that he will be more confident in spontaneously showing different behaviours that the trainer can 
choose to reward in the training process (Pryor 2009). Also in order to use the DAID method to teach 
dogs novel actions, a preliminary training is necessary for the dog to learn the imitation rule (see Topál 
et al. 2006). The amount of time needed for this preliminary training with the two methods was not 
considered in the present study (i.e., only already experienced subjects were tested) and it is possible 
that it varies between the two techniques, therefore making one technique more laborious than the other 
for the trainers and owners. Furthermore, although in Study 3 we enrolled only dog-owner dyads that 
achieved a training certificate for the training method they were tested on, we cannot completely rule 
out the possibility that there were some differences in their skilfulness and this could have slightly 
affected the results. Moreover we are aware that the comparison of learning rates is a very difficult 
issue because several factors, such as individual experience of each subject, may influence the results. 
Importantly, the results of this study do not claim for an absolute superiority of one training method 
over the other. Instead, we suggest the usefulness of the DAID method in addition to the already 
widespread techniques that rely on individual associative learning, such as shaping / clicker training, 
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particularly to teach dogs complex object-related tasks. This is the first study on the practical 
application of the DAID method and we only assessed its efficiency with regard to object-related 
actions to be trained. The results obtained should not be extended to training objectives that were not 
tested and it is possible that different kinds of actions can be more easily taught with shaping or other 
traditional methods that rely on individual associative learning. For example it is known that different 
species – i.e., chimpanzees (Myowa-Yamakoshi and Matsuzwa 1999), orang-utans (Call 2001) and 
dogs too (Huber et al. 2009) - show a higher difficulty in copying body movements, compared to 
object-related actions. Therefore, the results of the present study should not be automatically extended 
to tasks that are different from those actually tested and, in particular, should not be extended to the 
training of body movements. Furthermore, our measure of training success for Study 3 was the latency 
to the first correct performance of the action, which, in certain cases, might also occur by chance, 
particularly with shaping, where the dog learns by trial and error.  
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5.4 General discussion 
From the methodological point of view, the Do as I do paradigm has proven an effective method to 
study imitation in dogs. Dealing with behavioural similarity between two different species (humans and 
dogs) we used the definition of functional imitation (Topál et al. 2006) to adjust the coding of the 
performance as ‘match’ or ‘no match’ to the differences in the behaviour repertoire and body schemas 
of humans and dogs. The novel actions in Study 1 and 2 were considered as ‘match’ only if the body 
part used by the dog for performing the particular action was corresponding (e.g., the human’s hand 
touch was considered corresponding to the dog’s front paw touch). This is also a more stringent 
criterion for imitation than the one used by Miller et al. (2009) where a human demonstrator pulled a 
screen with hand and the dog’s performance was considered imitation even if the dog used his muzzle. 
In fact, as discussed above, the bidirectional procedure does not control for local enhancement, while 
the Do as I do paradigm, combined with the two-action procedure, is an effective and powerful test for 
imitation because it controls for all the other non-imitative learning processes and enables the 
researcher to investigate on similarity of actions also in terms of body movements. This method 
allowed us to discover that dogs are able to match their body movements to the action that was shown 
by the demonstrator, as it is required in imitation. Furthermore, assuming that dogs (as well as other 
species) can flexibly engage in different social learning processes according to the constraints of 
situation and the information provided (see Horner and Whiten 2005 and Range et al. 2007), without a 
specific training for imitation in which dogs learn that they are required to imitate, it is difficult to 
interpret negative results. For example it is impossible to exclude the possibility that, instead of lacking 
the cognitive ability to imitate, the subjects do not imitate because they rely on a different process 
and/or do not learn that they are required to imitate (see for example the negative results obtained by 
Tennie et al. 2009 in which, as discussed above, it is probable that the subjects did not know they were 
required to imitate). 
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In Study 1 we were able to show that dogs possess the ability of deferred imitation after intervals 
ranging from 0.40 to 10 minutes. From a cognitive perspective, this finding excludes that other 
mechanisms, which may trigger a similar behaviour in the observer at the same time as demonstration 
(e.g., facilitative processes, contagion), can be an exhaustive explanation of dogs’ ability to match their 
behaviour to human actions. Instead our results suggest the existence of the capacity to form a mental 
representation of the demonstration and to recall it after a delay, to use it as the basis for performing a 
matching action. Thus the Do as I do method could be also used to study how dogs represent the 
actions of others. A possible filed of further investigation includes dog’s representation of other’s goals 
and intentions and of intransitive actions (i.e., actions performed without interacting with an object). 
Huber et al. (2009) suggested that a dog who faced a vacuum demonstration (i.e., a demonstration of an 
object-related action performed by the demonstrator on nothing) ‘tried to make sense’ of it by 
reproducing a functionally similar goal-directed action using a proper target object, which was not used 
by the demonstrator. In Study 2 in some tests in which the demonstrator showed an action on an object, 
after the displacement, some dogs reproduced the body movement that was shown in the location 
where it was shown, thus on nothing (there was no object there). These results suggest that there might 
be some individual variation in how dogs represent functional and vacuum actions and more research 
would be needed to shed light on how dogs represent others’ goal-directed actions (see also Range et al. 
2007; Kaminski et al. 2011) and intransitive actions. 
Dogs ability of deferred imitation seems to be unaffected by changes in context to a certain extent: in 
Study 1 they were able to imitate after a delay of 1.5 minute in a different context when the objects 
were placed there in the same respective positions, and in Study 2 dogs were able to imitate after a 
delay of 1 minute if the only object that was present during the demonstration phase was displaced to a 
different location. However dogs’ imitative abilities dropped dramatically when the object used during 
demonstration was replaced with a completely different one. In fact, in the conditions in which the 
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position of two objects was shifted, dogs tended to approach the location where the demonstration was 
performed, rather than act on the object on which it was performed. These results are also consistent 
with many previous findings on dogs’ spatial bias. It is thus possible that, during memory retrieval, 
context and object features serve as a cues that help recall, especially in certain conditions, such as with 
longer retention intervals that challenge dogs’ memory. Several studies (e.g., Doré et. al 1996) suggest 
that dogs generally show difficulties to rely on figurative information to search for hidden objects. 
Dumas (1998) tested dogs in a delayed matching-to-sample paradigm, in which either spatial or 
figurative information was relevant to solve the task. Dogs’ performance was above chance only when 
spatial information could be used, but not when figurative cues were the clue to solve the task. Also 
rats (Cheng and Gallistel 1984) and pre-verbal human infants (Hermer and Spelke 1994) were shown to 
ignore figurative information and to favour geometric information instead. However, research on 
human infants’ development of object permanence generally suggests that figurative information can to 
some extent guide search behaviour for hidden objects (Butterworth 1982). Meltzoff and More (1998) 
propose that children’s copying accuracy in deferred imitation tasks relies on an ‘object-organized’ 
representational system. Accordingly, it is the objects’ representation that allows access to the action 
and infants do not represent the observed actions as separated mental entities. The stored representation 
includes both the object and the action performed on it together. Indeed when dogs (Fugazza and 
Miklósi 2013) and human infants (Meltzoff 1985, 1988) are provided the object manipulated by the 
demonstrator, they are able to reproduce observed actions after a delay without motor-practicing on 
them and the matching action is typically the first thing they perform on the object, thus the role of 
experience through individual learning can be excluded (note however that the two-action procedure is 
usually not included when testing imitation in human children, while it was included for dogs in Study 
1 - Fugazza and Miklósi 2013). 
Our subjects did not decrease their imitative performances with increased delay up to 10 minutes and 
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we later conducted further experimental work to investigate dogs’ memory of human actions after 
longer delays (Fugazza and Miklósi in preparation).  For this study we used a similar method but we 
increased the delays to assess if dogs possess long-term memory of imitative actions. The dogs (N=12) 
were tested after delays of different durations: 1 hour, 2 hours, 12 hours (overnight) and 24 hours and 
their imitative performance after those delays does not differ significantly from the performance of a 
control group (N=12) that was tested without delay. It is thus possible that dogs possess long-term 
memory of imitative actions. However we expect that dogs’ memory of human actions decreases with 
longer delays. Indeed, it is known that the length of the delay affects performance in the case of human 
pre-verbal infants (e.g., Klein and Meltzoff 1999; Óturai et al. 2012). Very long retention intervals, 
such as one week or four weeks, affect imitative behaviour and it has been hypothesized that this 
forgetting pattern might be due to the transfer of the acquired information to ‘very-long-term memory’ 
(Klein and Meltzoff 1999). 
Imitation after some delay has been claimed to indicate representational abilities in human infants (e.g., 
Carpenter et al. 1998b; Meltzoff 1995). Particularly, evidence for the capacity to imitate a novel action 
after a delay without previous motor practice of that action has also been used to provide a measure of 
declarative (non-verbal) memory (Barnat et al. 1996; Klein and Meltzoff 1999). For example Klein and 
Meltzoff (1999) assessed deferred imitation in 12-month-old using a procedure that did not allow 
subjects to motor practice on the tasks before the delay was imposed, therefore excluding that memory 
could be based on re-accessing a motor habit. The ability shown by human infants to recall the 
behaviour after a delay suggests presence of declarative (non-procedural) memory. Similarly, in Study 
1 and 2 we used a procedure in which dogs were not allowed to interact with the object before the ‘Do 
it!’ command was given (so called ‘observation-only procedure’ Klein and Meltzoff 1999). 
Furthermore the subjects’ view of the object was prevented, so that they could not keep their mind 
active on the demonstration by constantly looking at the target object. Thus dogs recalled the actions in 
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the absence of any direct or indirect cue that, during the retention interval, could have functioned as a 
perceptual trigger. In study 1 dogs imitated the actions after a delay also in those conditions in which 
novel actions were shown, without any previous practice of these particular actions, so that their 
memory and recall could not have been based on re-accessing a motor habit, because none was 
previously formed. Therefore dogs did not simply recognize and choose after a delay the object that 
was used during the demonstration, but also retrieved and reproduced an action they had not performed 
on this object before, without the possibility to base their recall on the aid of previous motor practice. 
Taken together, these results suggest the presence of some form of declarative memory for imitative 
actions in dogs and also claim for further investigation on this issue. In fact the Do as I do paradigm 
has not only proven successful to test imitative abilities but could be also an effective and innovative 
method for testing some forms of memory for events in dogs, like their ability to mentally travel back 
in time, representing the past (Suddendorf and Corballis 2010). In order to test such kind of memory in 
non-human animals researchers need to train the subjects to ‘answer questions’ about past events by 
giving behavioural responses (see Zentall 2013) and the modified version of the Do as I do method that 
we used to test dogs’ deferred imitation could be adapted to this purpose, because dogs are asked to 
‘report’ about a past event (i.e., reproduce it). Moreover with this method it may be possible to 
investigate an unexplored kind of episodic-like memory in animals, because in this case the subjects are 
asked to recall an event (the actions shown by the demonstrator) that they observed, but in which they 
did not act, so that re-accessing a motor-practice habit can be completely excluded.   
Our results are also important from the applied perspective. In fact, as shown in Study 3, the 
introduction of the use of social learning with the Do as I do method may be efficient in dog training, 
particularly for training dogs to perform complex object-related actions such as those typically required 
from dogs trained to assist disabled owners. We therefore think that the applied filed of dog training 
will benefit from the knowledge of dogs’ social learning abilities and that our research has also 
 88 
contributed to make a little step forward towards a training approach that takes into account the 
ethology of dogs. Furthermore dogs ability to flexibly use different social learning processes could be 
of particular benefit for the field of dog training because it is very likely that, when trained with the Do 
as I Do method for training purposes, dogs learn about the tasks by flexibly relying on different types 
of social learning processes, such as goal emulation, functional imitation, local and stimulus 
enhancement. Indeed social learning processes are utilized flexibly also by other species and the 
information gained socially may depend on the particular situation or task to be learned. For example 
Horner and Whiten (2005) found that the chimpanzees’ tendency to use emulation or imitation to solve 
a tool-using task depends on the availability of causal information that is provided during 
demonstration. Thus chimpanzees are able to flexibly use the learning process that is more efficient to 
reach the goal, given the environmental constrains of the situation. Dogs may also be able to engage in 
different social learning processes, according to the task and the situation (e.g., Miller et al. 2009, 
Kubinyi et al. 2009, Huber at al. 2009). In Study 1 we showed that dogs are able to match not only the 
goal of the human demonstrated action, as could be explained by goal emulation, but also the action, 
even if this action is not goal-directed. This ability can be explained only by functional imitation.  
 
5.5 General conclusion 
Across the dissertation we have shed light on different issues regarding dogs’ imitative abilities. Our 
results, consistently with previous studies on dogs’ social cognitive abilities, suggest that dogs are able 
to learn socially from both humans and conspecifics engaging in different kinds of social learning 
processes, including imitation.  
(1) We discovered that they possess the ability of deferred imitation, which implies the ability to 
form a mental representation of the demonstration and to recall it a later time. This cognitive 
skill may play a functional role in acquiring information socially from humans. It is likely that 
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this ability is not restricted to dogs and other canids may also possess it. Further investigation 
could reveal more precisely what functional role this skill might have both in dogs and in wild 
living canids. 
(2) We discovered that dogs’ imitative abilities can be generalized across contexts to a certain 
extent. However dogs’ spatial bias (i.e. their tendency to act in the location of demonstration) 
affects their imitative performance when they find a different object in the place where the 
demonstration was performed. 
(3) The ability of dogs to learn socially from humans can also be effectively exploited in dog 
training to make the learning process of some tasks more efficient compared the traditional 
methods that rely on individual learning.  
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